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ABSTRACT 
 
THE ECONOMIC AND BEHAVIORAL EFFECTS OF OFFERING FINANCIAL 
REWARDS FOR INTERNAL WHISTLE-BLOWING  
 
Bryan Richard Stikeleather, PhD 
 
University of Pittsburgh, 2013 
 
 
I compare two approaches employers can use to induce workers to blow the whistle on 
internal misconduct such as co-worker theft.  Employers can improve control over their 
resources and mitigate their substantial economic losses from internal misconduct if they can 
induce workers who observe such misconduct to report it.  Prior research suggests that non-
financial motivations drive worker whistle-blowing.  Consistent with this perspective, employers 
in practice rarely offer workers explicit financial rewards for whistle-blowing but instead rely on 
workers’ non-financial motivations to blow the whistle.   My dissertation compares the economic 
and behavioral effects of this approach relative to offering workers an explicit financial reward 
for whistle-blowing.   
 My study examines whistle-blowing using both analytical and experimental research 
methods.  First, I formulate an analytical model of whistle-blowing that integrates behavioral 
theory to help explain the conditions under which employers would prefer to induce whistle-
blowing by relying on workers’ non-financial motivation versus offering workers an explicit 
financial reward.  I find that neither approach strictly dominates, but rather that the optimal 
approach depends on the social norms that govern the interactions between workers and 
employers. My model also predicts that the approaches are mutually exclusive, i.e., employers 
v 
 
will induce whistle-blowing by relying either on workers’ non-financial motivations or on their 
financial self-interest, but not on both. 
 Second, I conduct experimental labor markets to determine whether employers can 
improve their welfare by offering workers an explicit financial reward for whistle-blowing and 
the behavioral consequences of doing so.  I find that employers can induce more whistle-blowing 
and earn higher payoffs by offering workers explicit financial rewards for whistle-blowing, but 
that this comes at the cost of decreasing workers’ non-financial motivation to blow the whistle.   
My study contributes to the theoretical understanding of whistle-blowing and provides 
practical insights that will help employers decide whether to offer workers an explicit financial 
reward for whistle-blowing.  In turn, this should help employers design better incentive contracts 
to induce whistle-blowing and improve their welfare.  I also discuss some potentially fruitful 
avenues for future research on whistle-blowing that could extend the analytical and experimental 
findings documented in my study.    
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PREFACE 
 
The next 100+ pages are in the formal academic style. I hope this provides me sufficient 
cover to write more informally here.  I owe the individuals acknowledged below much more than 
mere thanks, but that is the only currency with which a poor graduate student can afford to pay 
his debts.  The journey of a 1,000 miles begins with the first step.  The journey to my doctorate 
also began with a first step—a step into a freezing afternoon in February in Pittsburgh with a 
jacketless Don Moser at my side, earnestly recruiting me for Pitt’s doctoral program in 
accounting.  He gave excellent guidance then, and I am pleased to say he has given excellent 
advice ever since.  Further, I expect he will continue to do so, even if unsolicited, until he passes 
to his eternal reward.  He is a wonderful man, and I would not have lasted without him.  I also 
want to thank Harry Evans, Mei Feng, Jason Kuang, and Drew Newman for serving on my 
committee, for their feedback, and for the formation they have given me as an academic.  Carrie 
Woods and Chris Fedor also deserve high praise for all of their administrative support for our 
students.  Without them, we students would be lost.  I would also like to thank my friends and 
colleagues for their support, especially Patrick Martin and Michele Pulaski.  Likewise, I also 
wish to thank Douglas J. Sisterton, the Deloitte Foundation, Jake Birnberg’s Research Fund, and 
the Dean’s Small Research Grant Program for their financial support.  Most especially, I would 
like to thank my wife, Elissa, my children, and my parents for their emotional support and 
encouragement.  Finally, I owe many thanks to St. Matthew (patron of accountants), Ss. Thomas 
Aquinas and Albert the Great (Patrons of students), and my guardian angel for their spiritual 
support. 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
 
Workers who blow the whistle on co-worker misconduct, such as theft, mitigate their employers’ 
losses and improve internal control over resources.  Both academic researchers and corporate 
executives have actively discussed how to induce more workers to blow the whistle on such 
misconduct, with the general consensus suggesting that workers do so primarily for non-financial 
reasons (see, e.g., Miceli et al. 1991, Dozier and Miceli 1985, Miceli et al. 2008, and Barlyn 
2011).  Consistent with this, while employers could offer workers explicit financial rewards to 
blow the whistle, they instead generally rely only on workers’ non-financial motivation to do so 
(Miceli et al. 2008).  However, to induce more whistle-blowing, some employers are currently 
considering adopting formal programs that offer explicit financial rewards to workers who report 
misconduct (Barlyn 2011, Hirsch 2012).  My dissertation compares the behavioral and economic 
effects of relying only on workers’ non-financial motivation to blow the whistle versus offering 
workers an explicit financial reward to do so.  Such a comparison can help employers make more 
informed decisions about whether they should offer workers a financial reward for whistle-
blowing and what the consequences of doing so might be.   
My study uses two complementary methodologies to compare each approach of inducing 
whistle-blowing.  First, I draw on prior research on gift exchange and motivation crowding 
(further details provided below) to formulate a behavioral-analytical model of whistle-blowing 
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that helps to explain when and why employers will prefer to induce whistle-blowing by relying 
on workers’ non-financial motivation or by relying on their financial self-interest.  In brief, my 
model suggests that employers will prefer to rely on workers’ non-financial motivations to blow 
the whistle under certain conditions but will prefer to offer financial rewards to induce whistle-
blowing under other conditions.  That is, neither approach to inducing whistle-blowing clearly 
dominates the other but rather the preferred approach depends heavily upon the social norms that 
govern interactions between employers and workers.  My model also suggests that the 
approaches are mutually exclusive in that employers will rely on workers’ non-financial 
motivations or their financial self-interest to blow the whistle, but not both. 
Second, I conduct an experiment on whistle-blowing using the methods of experimental 
economics to provide empirical data about the relative effects of using each approach.  The 
experiment incorporates strategic interactions between employers and workers in an 
experimental labor market in which employers earn higher payoffs by inducing their workers to 
blow the whistle.  In practice, employers rarely offer explicit financial rewards for whistle-
blowing, which limits our ability to use field data to draw inferences about the effects of doing 
so.  Further, many confounds exist in the field that make it difficult to cleanly compare the two 
approaches.  In contrast, conducting an experiment in a controlled laboratory setting allows me 
to isolate the effects of each approach on employer welfare and worker behavior.  Thus, my 
study provides initial empirical evidence about (i) conditions under which employers could 
improve their welfare by offering workers explicit financial rewards for whistle-blowing and (ii) 
the behavioral consequences of offering workers such rewards.  I find that employers can induce 
more whistle-blowing and earn higher payoffs by offering workers explicit financial rewards for 
whistle-blowing, but that this comes at the cost of decreasing workers’ non-financial motivation 
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to blow the whistle.  Thus, my findings suggest employers should carefully consider whether the 
benefit of offering an explicit financial reward to induce more internal whistle-blowing 
outweighs the potential cost of decreasing workers’ non-financial motivation to help their 
employer. 
My dissertation proceeds as follows.  Chapter 2 provides the background and motivation 
for my study by reviewing prior whistle-blowing research.  Specifically, I review three streams 
of literature.  First, I provide background on the institutional features of whistle-blowing, i.e., I 
review survey data on the frequency and determinants of whistle-blowing.  This includes a 
review of relevant whistle-blowing research in organizational behavior, management, and social 
psychology.  Most prior research on whistle-blowing views it as pro-social organizational 
behavior intended to improve employer welfare.  Further, I discuss whistle-blowing practices 
currently observed in corporate and other economic settings.  Important differences exist 
between inducing internal whistle-blowing as a private employer and inducing external whistle-
blowing as a regulator or other third party.  I discuss these differences and their implications for 
designing incentive contracts to induce internal whistle-blowing, which is the type of whistle-
blowing my study addresses.   
Second, I discuss relevant findings on work relationships based on gift exchange, in 
which employers pay wages above the market-clearing level (i.e., gift wages) and workers 
positively reciprocate by providing effort above the enforceable level or by performing other 
beneficial acts for their employer.  Paying gift wages strongly increases workers’ non-financial 
motivation to help their employer, which can include increasing workers’ motivation to blow the 
whistle on co-worker misconduct.  Further, experimental gift exchange settings have features 
that make them ideal for studying incentive contracts and whistle-blowing.  I also discuss a novel 
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feature of my setting that extends prior work on gift exchange. Given that employers rarely offer 
explicit financial rewards for whistle-blowing, they might instead offer incremental gift wages to 
increase workers’ non-financial motivation to blow the whistle. 
Finally, Chapter 2 also provides background on the psychological phenomenon of 
motivation crowding.  Motivation crowding research suggests that offering financial rewards for 
pro-social behavior can actually decrease workers’ other-regarding behavior by decreasing their 
intrinsic motivation to perform beneficial tasks for their employer while providing them with 
insufficient extrinsic motivation to do so.  I discuss how concerns about motivation crowding 
might account for why employers in practice generally forgo offering explicit financial rewards 
for whistle-blowing.  I also refer back to the idea of motivation crowding in Chapter 3 when I 
develop my behavioral-analytical model of whistle-blowing and also in Chapter 4 in the 
development of several of my research questions. 
 In Chapter 3, I formulate a behavioral-analytical model of whistle-blowing within a 
principal-agent framework.  I begin by first constructing a model based on conventional 
economic assumptions of human behavior (i.e., all individuals are self-interested wealth-
maximizers).  My conventional model predicts that workers will always blow the whistle at no 
cost to the employer, and, consequently, employers will never expend financial resources to 
induce whistle-blowing, either in the form of an explicit financial reward or in the form of a gift 
wage.  I then extend the conventional analytical model by incorporating other-regarding behavior 
into the principal-agent framework.  Ultimately, I derive conditions under which risk-neutral 
employers will prefer to offer a financial reward for whistle-blowing in lieu of a gift wage or 
prefer to offer a gift wage in lieu of a financial reward.   
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 I find that neither approach to inducing whistle-blowing strictly dominates the other.  
However, my model predicts that the two approaches are mutually exclusive in that employers 
will offer a financial reward or a gift wage to induce whistle-blowing but will not offer both 
simultaneously.  Because the conventional model suggests employers will never expend 
incremental financial resources in any form to induce whistle-blowing and that workers will 
nonetheless always blow the whistle, conventional economic explanations cannot account for 
any deviations I observe from this predicted equilibrium when I conduct my experiment.  This, 
in turn, makes it more likely that the behavioral theory I integrate into the conventional model 
accounts for any such deviations (Brown et al. 2009).     
Chapter 4 develops the hypotheses and research questions that I test in my experiment.  
While I use the experiment to test certain predictions implied by the model I develop in Chapter 
3, I also use it to test other important features of whistle-blowing.  Complex behavioral theory 
underlies workers’ decisions about whether to blow the whistle on misconduct.  Consequently, at 
times this complexity leaves me unable to form directional hypotheses because two behavioral 
forces may simultaneously influence behavior in opposite directions.  Thus, I state several of the 
motivating questions of my study as research questions rather than as directional hypotheses. 
Chapter 5 presents the experimental design and procedures I use to test my hypotheses 
and research questions.  Unlike most prior whistle-blowing studies, which use hypothetical 
scenarios, employers and workers in my study strategically interact while facing real financial 
consequences for their decisions.  Employers make wage offers to workers for a fixed level of 
effort; probabilistically incur welfare losses from theft that only workers observe; and recover 
their losses if their worker blows the whistle (i.e, reports the theft).  Employers can try to 
strengthen their worker’s goodwill toward them by offering gift wages, which can induce more 
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whistle-blowing.  Using two treatment conditions, I vary whether employers can or cannot also 
offer workers a financial reward for whistle--blowing (Can Reward condition vs. Cannot Reward 
condition).  The Cannot Reward condition examines whether and how employers use gift wages 
to induce whistle-blowing in a setting similar to the natural context in that workers do not expect 
employers to offer them a financial reward for whistle-blowing.  The Can Reward condition 
examines whether and how employers complement or substitute gift wages with explicit 
financial rewards to induce whistle-blowing.  To test whether employers in these two treatment 
conditions offered incrementally higher compensation specifically to induce whistle-blowing, I 
use a third control condition identical to the Cannot Reward condition except that no theft or 
whistle-blowing can occur (No W/B condition).  Any difference in the level of compensation 
employers offered between the treatment (Can Reward and Cannot Reward) and control (No 
W/B) conditions implies that employers expended financial resources specifically to induce 
workers to blow the whistle.        
Chapter 6 reports my experimental results.  I find that employers in the Can Reward 
condition generally offered workers a financial reward for whistle-blowing, and those that did 
obtained a higher average payoff than employers in the Cannot Reward condition.  As detailed 
below, this higher payoff occurred because employers offered similar levels of compensation 
across the two treatment conditions, but workers blew the whistle significantly more frequently 
in the Can Reward condition.  Employers who offered a reward in the Can Reward condition 
offered a level of expected compensation (i.e., wage offer + the expected cost of the reward) 
similar to the level of expected compensation offered by their counterparts in the Cannot Reward 
condition (i.e., wage offer only), and thus employers’ expected costs did not significantly differ 
based on the mix of incentives they used.   
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By comparing expected compensation levels in the Cannot Reward and Can Reward 
conditions to the level in the No W/B condition, I can determine whether employers offered 
higher levels of compensation specifically to induce whistle-blowing. I find that they did so in 
both conditions, but, consistent with my behavioral model’s predictions, the form of the 
incremental compensation differed.  Specifically, employers in the Cannot Reward condition 
offered higher wages than those in the No W/B condition, suggesting that they attempted to use 
incrementally higher gift wages to induce whistle-blowing.  However, employers who offered a 
reward in the Can Reward condition did not offer higher average wages than employers in the 
No W/B condition.  Rather, these employers on average relied solely on offering a financial 
reward to induce workers to blow the whistle.   
Though employers offered workers similar levels of expected compensation across the 
Can Reward and Cannot Reward conditions, workers’ whistle-blowing decisions differed 
significantly across the two conditions.  Workers whose employer offered them a reward in the 
Can Reward condition blew the whistle on theft over twice as frequently as workers in the 
Cannot Reward condition.  Thus, financial rewards motivated whistle-blowing more than gift 
wages.  I also find that no worker in the Can Reward condition ever blew the whistle unless their 
employer had offered them a reward for doing so.  This suggests that rewards change workers’ 
perceptions of whistle-blowing from a pro-social to a self-interested act.  Exploring this further, I 
find that offering a whistle-blowing reward crowds out the positive effect of offering higher gift 
wages on workers’ whistle-blowing decisions.  Consistent with motivation crowding, I find that 
workers’ wages and perceived moral preference for whistle-blowing positively correlate with 
whistle-blowing in the Cannot Reward condition but not in the Can Reward condition. Thus, 
offering a reward induces more whistle-blowing than offering higher gift wages, but doing so 
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decreases workers’ non-financial motivation to blow the whistle.  Nonetheless, employers who 
offered an explicit financial reward still received higher payoffs relative to those in the Cannot 
Reward condition. 
Finally, Chapter 7 concludes my dissertation.  I discuss the contributions and limitations 
of my study as well as potential future research to extend my findings.  My dissertation provides 
new theoretical and methodological insights regarding whistle-blowing and also offers practical 
insights that senior executives may find useful when deciding whether and how to commit 
financial resources to induce whistle-blowing.  I find that the effectiveness of expending 
financial resources to induce whistle-blowing depends upon the incentive approach employers 
adopt.  Offering workers a higher level of gift wage increases their non-financial motivation to 
blow the whistle and positively affects whistle-blowing, but in my study it induces less whistle-
blowing and results in lower employer welfare than offering workers a financial reward to blow 
the whistle.  This suggests that, in certain settings, employers might benefit by offering workers 
an explicit financial reward for blowing the whistle—a practice rarely observed in current 
corporate practice but under consideration by some employers.  However, as discussed further in 
Chapter 7, employers must weigh any expected improvement in welfare from offering a financial 
reward against the potential costs of decreasing workers’ non-financial motivation to perform 
beneficial tasks for their employer.   
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2.0 BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION 
 
 
2.1 OVERVIEW OF CHAPTER 
My dissertation examines and compares two possible approaches employers can take to induce 
whistle-blowing.  Section 2.2 provides the broad motivation for my study.  Sections 2.3 through 
2.5 provide further background motivation.  First, Section 2.3 provides some institutional detail 
with respect to the incidence and nature of internal misconduct and whistle-blowing within 
firms.  Specifically, I review relevant surveys on internal misconduct and whistle-blowing as 
well as empirical and theoretical research on the determinants of whistle-blowing by researchers 
in organizational behavior, management, and social psychology.  Further, I discuss practices 
related to motivating whistle-blowing in corporate and other economic settings and include 
illustrative examples of corporate and non-corporate practices designed to induce whistle-
blowing.  This section also discusses differences between inducing internal whistle-blowing as a 
private employer and doing so as a public regulator or other external third party.   
Second, Section 2.4 describes the phenomenon of gift exchange, in which employers pay 
wages above the market-clearing level and workers reciprocate by providing effort above the 
enforceable level.  After briefly reviewing this literature, I explain how employers could possibly 
rely on gift exchange to induce whistle-blowing, and I also describe a novel feature of my setting 
that extends prior work on gift exchange.  
Third, Section 2.5 provides background on motivation crowding.  Prior research in this 
area suggests that tying explicit financial compensation to desired behavior may actually 
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decrease rather than increase the level of the desired behavior.  I discuss how this may help 
explain why employers generally do not offer explicit financial rewards for whistle-blowing.   
 
2.2 MOTIVATION FOR DISSERTATION 
Employers incur significant losses because their workers steal from them and commit other 
forms of misconduct.  They also incur costs to prevent internal misconduct from occurring and to 
detect when it has occurred.  For example, employers hire internal auditors and supervisors to 
review and monitor workers’ actions; they employ technology such as cameras and inventory 
tracking devices; and they expend resources to develop policies about ethical workplace behavior 
and to train workers on those policies.  Whistle-blowing constitutes a type of detective internal 
control, and it can help mitigate employers’ losses by allowing them to learn which workers 
commit misconduct and how they do so.  Employers may not need to expend any incremental 
financial resources to induce whistle-blowing if their workers have sufficient non-financial 
motivation to report misconduct.  Alternatively, if workers possess insufficient non-financial 
motivation to blow the whistle, employers could expend financial resources to induce more of it.  
My dissertation examines two ways of doing this.  First, employers could offer workers a gift 
wage (i.e., a fixed wage that exceeds the market-clearing level), which increases workers’ non-
financial motivation to blow the whistle and thus induces more whistle-blowing.  Second, 
employers could offer workers an explicit financial reward for whistle-blowing, which increases 
workers’ financial motivation to blow the whistle.   
My dissertation examines and compares how relying on non-financial versus financial 
motivation to induce whistle-blowing affects employer welfare through their effect on workers’ 
whistle-blowing behavior and employers’ expected compensation costs.  Given the economic 
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magnitude of employers’ losses from internal misconduct and the potential to mitigate those 
losses through whistle-blowing, examining different approaches to inducing whistle-blowing is a 
timely and important research area.  Prior whistle-blowing research has generally examined 
institutional and personal characteristics that influence whistle-blowing (Miceli et al. 2008).  In 
contrast, my study examines and compares two different ways employers could expend financial 
resources to induce more whistle-blowing within a context that incorporates gift exchange and 
strategic interaction between employers and workers.   
Employers rarely offer explicit financial rewards for whistle-blowing, and it remains 
unclear why they do not.  The gift exchange literature suggests that workers report observed 
misconduct more frequently when their employers treat them fairly (e.g., Zhang 2008).  Thus, 
employers may rarely offer whistle-blowing rewards because they believe doing so constitutes an 
inefficient use of financial resources.  If employers already pay their workers gift wages, offering 
a financial reward may actually decrease employer welfare if the cost of rewarding whistle-
blowers exceeds the incremental benefit from doing so.  This would happen if employers pay 
rewards to workers who would have chosen to blow the whistle without receiving financial 
remuneration for doing so.  As discussed later, it could also occur if a financial reward decreases 
worker’s non-financial motivation to blow the whistle.   
My study provides evidence about workers’ natural inclination to blow the whistle under 
“optimal” conditions: workers possess anonymity, have assurance that they will suffer no 
retaliation from colleagues and that their employer will correct the misconduct, and cannot 
diffuse responsibility for whistle-blowing to other workers. I examine how the wages employers 
offer workers, a proxy for fairness (Zhang 2008), influences workers’ whistle-blowing behavior.  
I also examine how offering workers an explicit financial reward for whistle-blowing affects 
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both their motivation to blow the whistle and employers’ total costs.  Employers often do not 
know the base rate of misconduct in their firm, especially with respect to white-collar crime.  
Thus, field data alone cannot isolate the incremental cost and benefit of various approaches of 
inducing whistle-blowing.  Not only do financial incentives to blow the whistle affect whistle-
blowing behavior, they may also indirectly affect the incidence of theft itself.  Because of the 
noise inherent in field and archival data, an experiment is especially well-suited for comparing 
variation in employer and worker behavior across the two different approaches I study.   
My dissertation mitigates potential confounds by holding constant the frequency (i.e., 
base rate) and magnitude of theft within the firm.  This allows me to isolate the direct effect of 
each approach to induce whistle-blowing on the behavior of employers and workers.  To the 
extent that offering an explicit financial reward or a gift wage induces relatively more whistle-
blowing, it should also serve, indirectly, as a greater deterrent to theft.  I do not incorporate this 
indirect deterrent effect into my study, which allows me to attribute any difference in the rate of 
whistle-blowing across approaches directly to each approach’s ability to induce whistle-blowing. 
Comparing each approach under ceteris paribus conditions allows me to isolate and compare 
employers’ ability to improve their welfare by increasing the incidence of whistle-blowing.     
Models of whistle-blowing in the organizational behavior literature generally do not 
incorporate workers’ preferences for wealth into workers’ decision about whether to blow the 
whistle on misconduct or instead remain silent.  Rather, these models generally assume that non-
financial, pro-social motives drive whistle-blowing (Miceli et al. 2008).  However, such 
assumptions stand in stark contrast to those found in conventional economic models, which 
assume financial self-interest primarily drives workers’ behavior.  Thus, conventional behavioral 
models of whistle-blowing generally incorporate no role for workers’ financial self-interest while 
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conventional economic models generally incorporate no role for workers’ non-financial 
motivation and other-regarding preferences.  I attempt to bridge these two extremes by 
developing an analytical model that assumes workers possess both non-financial motivation to 
blow the whistle and preferences for more wealth.  I then examine the implications of this model 
for employers wishing to induce whistle-blowing.  As explained in Chapter 3, my model 
suggests that employers will prefer to offer a financial reward in certain cases and a gift wage in 
other cases. 
Employers can use my findings to make more informed decisions about how best, if at 
all, to use financial resources to induce whistle-blowing in their firm.  Some employers are 
currently considering whether to offer workers a financial reward for whistle-blowing, and a 
small percentage of firms (< 10%) already do so (ACFE 2012).   My findings should help 
employers considering whether to offer whistle-blowing rewards to assess the likely benefit of 
doing so, and it can also help them assess the cost-effectiveness of offering rewards to induce 
whistle-blowing relative to an alternative approach that relies on strengthening workers’ non-
financial motivation to blow the whistle.   
 
2.3 MISCONDUCT AND WHISTLE-BLOWING WITHIN THE FIRM 
2.3.1 Internal Misconduct 
For the purposes of this study, I define internal misconduct as undesired actions workers commit 
to the detriment of employer welfare and about which employers wish to know so that they can 
recover their losses.  Internal misconduct constitutes a specific type of employee wrong-doing.  
Miceli et al. (2008) define wrong-doing as “illegal, immoral, or illegitimate practices (activities 
and omissions).”  Thus, internal misconduct constitutes wrong-doing committed by workers that 
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harms the employer—a key point because employers suffer loss as the victims of internal 
misconduct rather than derive benefits as the perpetrators of it.  In my dissertation, I examine 
only internal misconduct rather than other types wrong-doing.  Workers’ concerns about 
retaliation for whistle-blowing often stem from cases in which their employer desires to 
perpetrate wrong-doing rather than prevent it or cases in which employers provide workers with 
insufficient protection against co-worker retaliation.  Individuals who commit misconduct 
sometimes retaliate against those who blow the whistle either internally or to external parties 
such as regulators.  Employers who countenance wrong-doing already know of its existence and 
do not want workers to report it to external parties because the misconduct benefits the employer 
at the expense of others such as investors or society.  In contrast, I examine internal whistle-
blowing to employers about misconduct committed by co-workers that harms employer welfare 
and about which employers want to know so that they can recover their losses.          
Internal misconduct occurs frequently, carries high economic costs, and comes in a 
variety of forms.  Miethe and Rothschild (1994), citing two earlier works (Coleman 1989, 
Hollinger and Clark 1983), explain that employee theft during the 1980’s cost retail employers 
billions in stolen merchandise, adding an additional 2-4% to the cost of merchandise.  More 
recently, a 2008 industry survey finds retailers lose as much as $16 billion annually from worker 
theft (NRSS 2008), consistent with figures found in a follow-up 2012 survey (NRSS 2012).  
Specifically, the 2012 survey estimates retail inventory shrinkage, from both internal misconduct 
by workers and shoplifters, cost employers 1.41 percent (1.49 percent) of retail sales in 2011 
(2010), at a cost of $34.5 billion ($37.1 billion) (NRSS 2012).   Of this, employee theft 
constituted 43.9 percent of the total 2011 loss, or $15.15 billion.  A separate study estimates that 
35%, or $41.65 billion, of world-wide retail inventory shrinkage results from employee theft 
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(Centre for Retail Research 2011).  Dickens et al. (1989) estimate employee theft may account 
for 5%-30% of business failures per year.  Likewise, Willis (1986) estimates that, within the air 
cargo and freight shipping industries, employee theft constitutes 80% of employers’ losses.   
 Asset misappropriation refers to the theft and misuse of cash or other assets, such as 
inventory, either directly or indirectly through skimming, larceny, billing and payroll schemes, 
fraudulent write-offs, check tampering, etc.  In the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners’ 
(ACFE) 2012 corporate fraud survey, firms report that asset misappropriation plays a role in over 
85% of discovered cases of internal misconduct, potentially costing the typical firm 5% or more 
of its revenue each year (ACFE 2012).  In 2011, Pricewaterhouse Coopers surveyed senior 
executives at 3,877 firms in 78 countries regarding economic crimes (i.e., crimes committed to 
deprive firms of money and/or property) and found 34% of all respondents (45% of U.S. 
respondents) reported discovering incidents of economic crime within the last 12 months.  Of 
these, 56% report that inside jobs comprised the most serious incidents and 72% reported the 
crime related to asset misappropriation (PwC 2011).  
Based on the available survey data, the average act of internal misconduct appears to 
have less economic significance than the average act of external misconduct, but it occurs much 
more frequently.  Of the fraudulent schemes reported in its annual fraud survey, the ACFE 
(2012) finds the average estimated size of external financial statement fraud to be $1 million per 
act versus $120,000 per act for internal fraud from asset misappropriation.  However, the survey 
also finds that financial statement fraud accounted for only about 8% of the total frauds reported 
to it, whereas asset misappropriation comprised over 85% of cases.  Accurate estimates of the 
level of non-retail theft remain difficult to obtain because many employers never learn that their 
white-collar workers have committed internal misconduct.  If formal anti-fraud measures and 
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other internal controls fail to prevent or detect internal misconduct, then employers may never 
learn that such misconduct has occurred.  Likewise, even if, as in the retail industry, employers 
know the magnitude of losses from employee theft, the formal internal controls may still fail to 
prevent the losses.  However, as discussed next, employers could possibly rely on a more 
informal control—whistle-blowing by workers who observe a co-worker’s internal misconduct 
and choose to report it to the employer.  
Finally, employers incur significant costs not just from internal misconduct by their 
workers but also from the related costs they bear to implement preventive and detective controls 
related to preventing misconduct from occurring in the first place.  Employers spend billions of 
dollars annually to prevent and detect internal misconduct (Dickens et al. 1989).  Thus, for 
example, estimates on global loss prevention expenditures alone run to $28.3 billion in 2011, 
including $8.7 billion for security equipment and almost $16 billion for loss-prevention 
employees (Centre for Retail Research 2011).  Likewise, employers also incur significant costs 
from hiring internal auditors and supervisors to help detect and prevent internal misconduct.   
2.3.2 Determinants of Whistle-blowing  
Prior to discussing some determinants of whistle-blowing, I first clarify what I mean by whistle-
blowing. The standard reference text on whistle-blowing, Miceli et al. (2008), draw on earlier 
work by Near and Miceli (1985, p. 4) and define whistle-blowing as “the disclosure by 
organization members (former or current) of illegal, immoral, or illegitimate practices under the 
control of their employers, to persons or organizations that may be able to effect action.”  The 
ability to “effect action” implies that employers can recover losses and prevent future acts of 
internal misconduct once they learn the identity of the wrong-doers or how misconduct occurs. 
For example, learning the identity of wrong-doers enables employers to stop the internal 
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misconduct simply by firing the wrong-doers, while learning how misconduct occurs allows 
employers to implement more effective controls over their resources and the actions of their 
workers.   
Employers can learn about internal misconduct by inducing their workers to report any 
wrong-doing that they observe a co-worker commit.  Co-workers often observe a colleague’s 
internal misconduct but do not participate in it (i.e., do not collude).  Thirty-four percent of U.S. 
workers surveyed by Labaton Sucharow (2011) report observing or having firsthand knowledge 
of workplace misconduct.  Forty-five percent of workers in a 2011 survey on workplace behavior 
by the Ethics Resource Center (“ERC”) report observing workplace misconduct such as theft, 
falsifying work hours, or misusing company resources within the prior year (ERC 2011a).  
Employers discover internal misconduct primarily through co-worker tips.  The ACFE’s fraud 
survey reports that for cases in which employers detected workplace fraud, over 43% of 
detections resulted from a tip, and over half of these tips (50.9%) came from workers (ACFE 
2012).  The 2011 PwC survey previously cited reports that 16% of respondents reported 
discovering economic crime as a result of tips/whistle-blowing by workers, down from 29% in 
2005 (PwC 2011).  A 2009 PwC survey reports that internal whistle-blowers provide U.S. 
employers with more information about economic crimes than all other internal controls 
combined (PwC 2009).        
What causes workers to report observed misconduct?  Prior studies typically suggest that 
workers blow the whistle primarily to aid others, even if the worker might also benefit personally 
from doing so (see, e.g., Dozier and Miceli 1985, Brief and Motowidlo 1986, Miceli et al. 1988, 
Brennan and Kelly 2007, Miceli et al. 2008, Xu and Ziegenfuss 2008, Seifert et al. 2010).  This 
perspective also reflects commonly observed practice, in which a significant proportion of 
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workers blow the whistle despite the fact that they have no financial incentive to do so and may 
risk incurring financial costs in the form of retaliation by co-workers.  Thus, for example, the 
2011 ERC survey finds that 65% of workers who observed internal misconduct indicate they 
reported it, up from 53% who did so in 2005, even though 22% of these whistle-blowers reported 
experiencing some form of retaliation in return (ERC 2011a).
1
  Almost every whistle-blower 
surveyed by the ERC (99.5%) claims to have reported observed misconduct because it was the 
“right thing to do” (ERC 2011b).  Consistent with these responses, prior studies find a positive 
association between workers’ level of moral reasoning and their whistle-blowing decisions 
(Miceli et al. 1991, Xu and Ziegenfuss 2008, Liyanarachchi and Newdick 2009).   
None of the most commonly cited reasons in the ERC survey for why workers remain 
silent about internal misconduct relate to the lack of financial incentives for whistle-blowing, 
which suggests that the potential for a financial reward has little salience to workers when 
deciding whether to blow the whistle.
2
  Rather, workers cite four primary factors for why they 
remain silent: (i) a belief that no corrective action would occur; (ii) a fear of retaliation; (iii) 
concerns about a lack of anonymity; and (iv) a belief others would report the misconduct (ERC 
2011b).  As shown later, my experimental design controls for all of these factors, and thus they 
cannot explain my results.  
Firms typically frame internal whistle-blowing as pro-social behavior that strengthens 
their ethical culture.  Corporate codes of conduct also tend to emphasize protection for whistle-
blowers from retaliation by others.  For example, the cover of Proctor & Gamble’s worldwide 
                                                          
1
 69 percent of workers who observed misconduct in the form of theft say they chose to report it (ERC 2011a).  
However, this survey relies on self-reporting by workers, and thus fewer workers may have actually reported 
misconduct than those who claimed to have done so.   
2
 The potential for a receiving a financial reward also does not appear to motive workers deciding whether to blow 
the whistle on external misconduct to outside parties.  Workers rate the potential for a financial reward as the factor 
least likely to motivate their external whistle-blowing decision, while rating the severity of the crime and the harm to 
others caused by keeping silent as most important (ERC 2011b).   
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business conduct manual says, “We do the right thing” and, later, “You also have a duty to our 
Company and your fellow P&Gers to report any known or suspected violations of our [conduct 
manual], Company policy, or the law.  By making such a report, you are protecting the 
reputation and integrity of our Company, our Brands, and our People” (Proctor 2012).3  
Likewise, employers rarely offer workers an explicit financial reward for reporting misconduct 
(Miceli et al. 2008), which suggests that they adopt a pro-social approach toward inducing 
whistle-blowing.   
In contexts other than employment settings, certain entities often choose to offer 
conditional financial incentives to induce whistle-blowing (i.e. offer a financial reward).  This 
provides individuals with a strict financial incentive to report the wrong-doing that they observe.  
Less than 10% of firms offer workers an explicit financial reward for whistle-blowing (ACFE 
2012), but the practice occurs quite frequently in other settings.  For example, a worker can 
charge his employer with defrauding the government and can file a qui tam lawsuit on behalf of 
the government against the employer, which, if successful, gives the worker a 10% – 30% share 
in any settlement, penalties, or fines levied on the employer.  Two recent archival studies find 
that workers blow the whistle more frequently in industries that rely heavily on government 
contracts (e.g., healthcare and defense) and thus offer a greater possibility of filing qui tam 
lawsuits (Bowen et al. 2010, Dyck et al. 2010).  Likewise, the SEC, IRS, and Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) offer “bounties” that pay whistle-blowers 10%-30% of any 
fines or penalties collected by the regulator from a company as a result of the whistle-blower’s 
information (SEC 2012, IRS 2012, CFTC 2012).      
                                                          
3
 Coca-Cola’s Code of Business Conduct states: “We all have an obligation to uphold the ethical standards of The 
Coca-Cola Company. If you observe behavior that concerns you, or that may represent a violation of our Code, raise 
the issue promptly” and “The Company values the help of employees who identify potential problems that the 
Company needs to address.  Any retaliation against an employee who raises an issue honestly is a violation of the 
Code...” (Coca-Cola 2008). 
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The U.S. Department of Justice pays confidential informants up to $25,000 per case and 
up to $100,000 per year for providing “useful and credible information…regarding felonious 
criminal activities” (DOJ 2001).  Crime Stoppers, a private organization devoted to fighting 
crime by eliciting tips from witnesses, pays individuals who provide tips a modest cash reward 
when their information leads to arrests.  From 1976-2010, Crime Stoppers reports having paid 
$93.8 million in rewards in exchange for information that led to the recovery of $2.0 billion 
worth of stolen property, the seizure of $7.9 billion worth of illegal drugs, and over 825,000 
arrests (Crime Stoppers International 2010). 
However, significant differences exist between the settings described above and internal 
whistle-blowing.  Regulators and Crime Stoppers may offer whistle-blowers a financial reward 
because they have limited ability to foster the goodwill of individuals who have no recurring 
relationship with their organizations.
4
  Likewise, if individuals fear retaliation for blowing the 
whistle, goodwill alone may not suffice to induce workers to report co-workers’ illegal deeds.  In 
cases of internal misconduct, employers are the victims rather than the perpetrators of crime and 
thus would not want to retaliate against whistle-blowers.  Further, employers can more easily 
protect internal whistle-blowers from retaliation by co-workers than the police can protect their 
informants from retaliation by external criminal groups.  For example, employers can protect 
internal whistle-blowers from co-worker retaliation by firing the co-worker who has committed 
misconduct or by providing workers with access to anonymous reporting hotlines.  Regulators 
may also offer a reward because external whistle-blowing typically involves mixed moral 
consequences.  Some individuals may want to report corporate wrong-doing to regulators but 
believe that doing so could harm the innocent, such as when whistle-blowing causes innocent 
                                                          
4
 Likewise, regulators may care less about the cost of a reward and thus more likely to offer one because the cost of 
the reward is often borne not by the regulator but by firms.  Often, firms’ settlements with regulators include 
punitive fines and penalties, which can substantively cover the cost of a whistle-blowing reward. 
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shareholders to lose their life savings or costs innocent workers their jobs.  These mixed moral 
consequences may lead workers to view remaining silent as morally appropriate.  Consequently, 
regulators must overcome this by offering an explicit financial reward for workers who report 
misconduct.  In contrast, employers can usually ensure that they do not harm the innocent 
members of their organization when they punish the guilty.     
One recent survey finds 8.6% of U.S. firms surveyed offer financial rewards for internal 
whistle-blowers (ACFE 2012).  Likewise, some firms are considering offering workers a reward 
for reporting misconduct, while others remain resistant (Barlyn 2011, Katz 2010).  Recent 
articles in Forbes (Hirsch 2012, Kelton 2012) suggest firms should offer a reward to encourage 
workers to report co-worker misconduct: “Consider offering cash rewards for tips that save 
money through process improvement, as well as for tips that identify fraud, waste, and abuse” 
(Hirsch 2012).  However, Joe Murphy, the director of public policy for the Society of Corporate 
Compliance and Ethics, argues that most whistle-blowers report misconduct not because of the 
influence of money but because “…they see something wrong with the company and want it 
fixed...Offering money is insulting…Make it clear you won’t retaliate. Then you won’t have to 
give people money” (Barlyn 2011).  Consistent with this view, a 2010 PwC survey of 
representatives from 111 U.K. organizations found that when asked whether offering a cash 
reward program for whistle-blowing would encourage an open and transparent whistle-blowing 
culture, over 52.2% of all respondents either disagreed or strongly disagreed versus only 24.3% 
who either agreed or strongly agreed (PwC 2011b).  This suggests that senior executives in many 
firms do not believe financial rewards would significantly improve workers’ whistle-blowing 
behavior.       
 
22 
 
2.4  PRIOR RESEARCH ON GIFT EXCHANGE 
As described above, employers could induce workers to blow the whistle by offering them 
financial resources in the form of an explicit financial reward for whistle-blowing.  However, 
rather than offer an explicit financial reward for whistle-blowing, employers could offer higher 
fixed wages.  Doing so may increase workers’ non-financial motivation to blow the whistle by 
increasing their goodwill toward the employer.  As described below, offering workers high fixed 
wages increases their non-financial motivation to help their employer, which can improve 
employer welfare.  Thus, employers could expend financial resources in the form of an explicit 
financial reward to increase workers’ financial motivation to whistle-blow and/or could offer 
higher fixed wages to increase workers’ non-financial motivation to blow the whistle.  This 
section examines the latter approach. 
 Like any other factor of production, labor has a market-clearing price.  Under 
conventional economic theory, the quantity of labor that workers supply and the quantity 
employers demand converge at an equilibrium price, or “market-clearing wage,” at which all 
employers who wish to hire workers at the market wage can do so and all workers who wish to 
provide labor in exchange for the market wage can also do so.  Consequently, no unemployment 
should exist (see, e.g., Nicholson 2005).  However, in contrast to this prediction, some employers 
pay wages above the market-clearing level even though they could hire sufficient workers at the 
market wage (Krueger and Summers 1988, Dickens and Katz 1986a, Dickens and Katz 1986b), 
while simultaneously we observe persistent unemployment in the labor market.    
Akerlof (1982) first proposed the idea of labor market gift exchange to help explain this 
phenomenon.  He theorized that a norm of reciprocity could help explain why employers paid 
wages in excess of the market-clearing level, or “gift wages.”  Specifically, he theorized that 
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employers could offer workers gift wages, and, in exchange, workers would provide effort that 
exceeds the minimum enforceable level as a way to reciprocate the gift wage.  Experimental 
economists have thoroughly documented gift exchange in laboratory settings (see, e.g., Charness 
and Kuhn 2011, Fehr et al. 1993, 1997, 1998, Anderhub et al. 2002, Hannan et al. 2001).  This 
documentation also includes settings with multiple workers (Charness and Kuhn, 2007, Choi 
2012, Gachter et al. 2012, Abeler et al. 2011, Maximiano et al. 2007), and, to a weaker extent, 
field studies (Bellemare and Shearer 2009, Chen and Sandino 2012, Cohn et al. 2012, Dellavigna 
2009, Falk 2007, Gneezy and List 2006, Kube et al. 2006, 2012). These studies typically find 
that gift exchange results in greater employer and worker welfare relative to that predicted using 
conventional economic theory.  Thus, gift exchange can result in social welfare improvements, 
including Pareto optimal social welfare improvements (Charness et al. 2004, Charness and Kuhn 
2011, Kuang and Moser 2009). 
Employers also self-select into offering gift wages even when they could offer a 
theoretically optimal “forcing” contract (Kuang and Moser 2009).  Thus, employers appear to 
recognize the mutually beneficial exchanges that can take place when they deviate from 
theoretically optimal self-interested behavior and instead offer workers gift wages.  Further, most 
of the studies cited earlier use single-period interactions between employers and workers.  Thus, 
reputational concerns cannot account for gift exchange, but rather gift exchange must arise from 
underlying norms of reciprocity not considered by conventional economic theory.   
Gift exchange also helps to explain why stark wage disparities may exist between two 
closely matched competitors.  For example, Costco pays its workers an average wage of around 
$17 per hour versus only $9.86 - $11.52 per hour paid by Sam’s Club, its primary competitor 
(Cascio 2006). Offering a higher wage provides Costco with many incremental benefits as a 
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result of the voluntary tasks its workers perform to reciprocate their wages. As Cascio (2006) 
states, “In return for its generous wages and benefits, Costco gets one of the most loyal and 
productive workforces in all of retailing—and, probably not coincidentally, the lowest shrinkage 
(employee theft) figures in the industry.”  Thus, gift wages can provide multiple unobservable 
benefits to employers besides higher levels of effort.  In sum, certain employers, such as Costco, 
exploit gift exchange to improve their welfare in multiple areas.  As discussed below, gift wages 
could possibly yield incremental benefits to employers by inducing whistle-blowing; offering 
workers generous gift wages increases their loyalty and goodwill toward their employer, which 
in turn could increase whistle-blowing on internal misconduct.  
 In addition to influencing the level of non-contractible effort that workers provide, 
offering a gift wage also correlates with lower rates of worker theft (Greenberg 1990 and Chen 
and Sandino 2012), more honest reporting by managers (Zhang 2008), and higher levels of 
whistle-blowing on dishonest peers (Zhang 2008).
5
  Thus, offering a gift wage can induce more 
whistle-blowing.  Firms may forgo offering a reward for whistle-blowing because they believe 
maintaining a good working relationship with their workers, which gift wages help foster, makes 
offering a reward unnecessary.  Further, if workers have other non-financial preferences to report 
misconduct, such as their personal morality, a financial reward may result in employers 
needlessly bearing incremental costs to reward whistle-blowing that workers would otherwise 
have provided at no cost to the employer.  
 My dissertation introduces a novel feature into the standard gift exchange context.  In 
prior gift exchange settings, employers and workers have misaligned financial incentives.  
                                                          
5
 Zhang (2008) compares the effect of offering a gift wage while holding constant all other forms of compensation.  
This study, in contrast, compares the interactive effect of both the level and the form of compensation offered to 
workers.  Likewise, Zhang’s (2008) setting focuses on preventing collusion among managers.  In my setting, 
managers cannot collude and, unlike Zhang’s (2008) setting, obtain no possible financial benefit from remaining 
silent about the misconduct they observe. 
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Employers benefit financially when they induce their workers to take a desired unobservable 
action, such as providing higher effort, but workers do not find it in their financial interest to do 
so.  Gift wages help mitigate the negative effects of such a misalignment by strengthening 
workers’ non-financial concern for their employers’ welfare.  This in turn makes workers more 
willing to make costly sacrifices to help their employer (Akerlof 1982).  Thus, offering a gift 
wage increases workers’ propensity to provide costly, unobservable effort; to forego profitable 
collusion in the form of budgetary slack (Zhang 2008); and to temper opportunistic thefts of 
inventory and cash (Chen and Sandino 2012).   
In my setting, no conflicting incentives exist between employers and their workers, and 
thus no conventional principal-agent problem exists to overcome.  Workers incur neither gains 
nor losses from a co-worker’s misconduct.  Rather, they observe any misconduct that occurs but 
do not participate in it, which, as described earlier, mirrors situations commonly encountered in 
the natural setting.
6
  Further, workers in my setting incur no financial cost to blow the whistle.  
As such, no financial disincentive exists to discourage workers from reporting observed 
misconduct.  
As discussed in more detail later, the lack of conflicting financial incentives between 
employers and workers makes it unclear whether employers will choose to expend any 
incremental financial resources specifically to induce whistle-blowing.  The fact that workers 
have no financial disincentives to blow the whistle makes whistle-blowing an inherently pro-
social activity that can only increase social welfare in a Pareto optimal fashion.  Consequently, 
given that whistle-blowing makes Pareto improvements in social welfare, both conventional 
                                                          
6
 In Zhang’s (2008) study, whistle-blowing occurs in the context of a prisoner’s dilemma between managers, who 
must decide whether to collude together to commit misconduct or blow the whistle.  In order to prevent collusion 
from occurring, the firm relies on a mutual monitoring incentive contract that provides whistle-blowers with a 
reward in addition to their base wages.   
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economic theory and pro-social organizational models of whistle-blowing suggest workers will 
voluntarily choose to blow the whistle to their employer without demanding that their employer 
offer them an explicit financial reward for doing so.  
 
2.5 PRIOR RESEARCH ON MOTIVATION CROWDING 
2.5.1 Motivation Crowding Theory 
This section provides background on the relationship between financial and non-financial 
motivation for behaving pro-socially.  Individuals behave as they do for many reasons.  In the 
present context, for example, workers may have moral preferences to blow the whistle and, if 
employers offer a financial reward for whistle-blowing, also have a financial incentive to do so.  
Prior research examines the effect on other-regarding behavior of having both a financial and a 
non-financial incentive to behave pro-socially.  Conventional economic theory, which has not 
historically incorporated other-regarding preferences into individual utility functions, suggests 
that offering financial incentives for behaving pro-socially should only (weakly) increase the 
incidence of pro-social behavior and should never decrease it.  As such, offering a nominal 
reward should induce complete whistle-blowing because even a small reward provides workers 
with a strictly positive financial incentive to blow the whistle.   
In this section, I review prior studies in experimental economics that suggest that offering 
conditional financial incentives for behaving pro-socially can have perverse effects.  These 
studies find that conditioning financial incentives on pro-social behavior can actually decrease 
individuals’ willingness to behave pro-socially, a phenomenon known as motivation crowding.  
As such, offering financial incentives can “crowd out” non-financial motivations.  In other 
words, while offering financial incentives has a direct positive effect on pro-social behavior 
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because individuals value wealth, it also has an indirect negative effect on behavior because 
financial and non-financial motivations appear to act as substitutes for one another rather than as 
complements.  Thus, the cost employers incur to overcome this substitution effect may outweigh 
the incremental benefit they receive from providing financial incentives for pro-social behavior 
such as whistle-blowing.  If workers frequently blow the whistle for no explicit financial reward, 
then little reason exists to offer them one.  If, however, workers have weak non-financial 
motivation to whistle-blow, even in cases in which they remain financially indifferent to whistle-
blowing versus remaining silent, then offering a reward might actually increase employer 
welfare by inducing more whistle-blowing.  The key issue in such cases is the direct and indirect 
cost of using financial incentives to motivate pro-social behavior.  Below, I discuss the 
motivation crowding literature further and consider it as a possible explanation for why 
employers rarely offer workers explicit financial rewards for whistle-blowing.   
Gneezy et al. (2011) suggest that financial incentives affect human behavior both 
directly, through individuals’ utility for wealth, and also indirectly via psychological 
mechanisms that affect individual’s non-financial motivation. Thus, for example, financial 
incentives can decrease the strength of a social norm of reciprocity between employers and 
workers.  As Gneezy and Rustichini (2000a) explain: 
“A…social norm that may be undermined by monetary compensation is reciprocity. Suppose that 
an action is originally performed in return for a previous benefit, but that money is paid for it. 
Then the compensation rather than the reciprocity will probably be taken as a motivation for that 
action. The incentive for reciprocity is destroyed, and the action becomes less appealing on its 
own merits.” 
 
 Titmuss (1971) argued that offering financial payment to blood donors for blood donations 
could lower their willingness to donate blood because it “crowds out” their non-financial 
motivation to do so.  Since Titmuss’ work, economists have developed a significant stream of 
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literature, especially in the last 15 years, that examines how financial incentives that reward 
(penalize) a certain behavior can actually decrease (increase) the frequency of the behavior (see, 
e.g., Bowles 1998, Frey and Jegen 2001, and Bowles and Polania-Reyes 2012 for surveys).  
Bowles and Polania-Reyes (2012) provide a concise and accurate description of “crowding out”:   
“Explicit economic incentives designed to increase contributions to public goods and to promote 
other pro-social behavior sometimes are counterproductive or less effective than would be 
predicted among entirely self-interested individuals.  This may occur when incentives adversely 
affect individuals’ altruism, ethical norms, intrinsic motives to serve the public, and other social 
preferences” (Bowles and Polania-Reyes 2012). 
Crowding out occurs when financial and non-financial motivation act as substitutes rather 
than as complements for each other.  Bowles and Polania-Reyes (2012) survey 50 experimental 
studies in economics regarding crowding out and find substantial evidence that crowding out 
occurs in both field settings (Gneezy and Rustichini 2000b) and laboratory settings, including in 
laboratory gift exchange settings (Fehr and Schmidt 2007, Fehr et al. 2007, Dickenson and 
Villeval 2008, Stanca et al. 2009, Fehr and Gachter 2002, Houser et al. 2008, Irlenbusch and 
Sliwka 2005, Gachter et al. 2011).
7
  Based on their survey of the literature, Bowles and Polania-
                                                          
7
 Of the gift exchange studies cited, two deserve further mention.  Fehr and Schmidt (2007) allow employers to offer 
one of two contract types.  Employers may either (i) announce an unenforceable bonus payable subject to providing 
a desired level of unenforceable effort or (ii) use a combined contract that couples the unenforceable bonus with a 
fine that workers probabilistically incur if they shirk.  They find that most employers forgo the combined contract in 
favor of the bonus contract.  This results in greater social welfare and worker payoffs at no significant decrease in 
profit for the employer or decrease in worker effort.  Likewise, workers perceive that employers “who are less fair 
are more likely to choose a combined contract and are less likely to pay the announced bonus” (Bowles and Polania-
Reyes 2012).  This is consistent with the idea that the employer’s choice in how to structure financial incentives 
provides workers with information about the employer’s beliefs and motivations.  Irlenbusch and Sliwka (2005) find 
evidence that introducing piece rates into compensation functions can alter both employer and worker perceptions of 
the job situation.  In one condition of their study, employers offer a fixed wage “trust” contract for effort, whereas in 
the other condition employers can supplement the fixed wage with a variable “piece-rate” contract.  They find that 
workers offered the piece-rate contract provide lower levels of effort, and this effect continues even after a fixed 
wage contract replaces the piece-rate contract.  When employers must offer only the fixed-wage contract, workers 
provide significantly more effort and employers obtain significantly higher profits relative to when employers can 
choose which contract to offer.  Irlenbusch and Sliwka (2005) conjecture that choosing an incentive scheme may 
“lead agents to adopt an individual maximization frame under which individuals tend to focus on the maximization 
of current payoffs rather than a cooperative frame, where they may be guided towards a more cooperatively oriented 
or reciprocal behavior.” 
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Reyes (2012) propose three related reasons for why and when motivation crowding occur, which 
are consistent with those given by Frey and Jegen (2001).  Each of these reasons assumes 
individuals have state-dependent preferences to some extent, which means that individuals’ 
preferences, including their other-regarding preferences, vary depending upon the type of social 
situation in which they find themselves.   
First, motivation crowding can occur when individuals feel a loss of autonomy and put 
upon or boxed in to a decision (see James 2005).  Thus, for example, if individuals believe anti-
littering laws that impose fines for littering restrict their personal autonomy too much, then such 
laws can actually induce more littering, i.e., more anti-social behavior.  However, financial 
rewards provide a financial incentive for voluntary pro-social behavior rather than a financial 
disincentive that penalizes anti-social behavior.  Thus, when considering the possible effect of 
offering a financial reward for whistle-blowing, concerns about restricting personal autonomy 
appear less pertinent because workers’ welfare remains unchanged if they remain silent and only 
increases if they blow the whistle.    
Second, and of more pertinence, offering financial incentives can influence individuals’ 
beliefs about the intentions of the one offering the financial incentive, which in turn can 
influence subsequent decisions.  Thus, for example, using a two-person (A and B), two-stage 
symmetric gift exchange setting, Stanca et al. (2009) show that B exhibits weaker levels of 
positive reciprocity toward A when B believes that strategic concerns rather than generosity 
motivate A’s initial decision.  In short, individuals exhibit less positive reciprocity when they 
believe strategic self-interest rather than genuine selflessness motivates another’s generosity.  In 
the context of whistle-blowing, employers who offer workers a financial reward for whistle-
blowing may signal to those workers that they believe the workers lack sufficient non-financial 
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motivation to report wrong-doing and will do so only if they receive explicit financial 
compensation in return. Such a signal might result in a self-fulfilling prophecy. This is especially 
true if, as some claim (Hirsch 2012), workers would view offers of reward money as “insulting.”   
Third, financial incentives can influence how individuals perceive the social setting that 
governs their interactions with others, which can influence the actions individuals consider 
socially appropriate or normal (see also List and Levitt 2007 and Fiske 1992).  Fiske (1992) 
proposed that four elementary social settings govern most social interaction among humans; (i) 
communal, (ii) authority ranking, (iii) equality matching, and (iv) market pricing.  Of these four, 
I focus on equality matching and market pricing, the two settings most pertinent to this study.  
Interactions marked by equality matching are guided by the perceived fairness with which 
individuals in the interaction treat each other.  As Fiske (1992) states, “The idea is that each 
person is entitled to the same amount as each other person in the relationship, and that the 
direction and magnitude of an imbalance are meaningful.” Social interactions under equality 
matching tend rely heavily on a balanced notion of reciprocity among individuals.  Thus, social 
norms that encourage the payment of gift wages and discourage offering financial rewards signal 
that equality matching should govern social interactions and therefore the norm of reciprocity 
should apply.   
In contrast, individuals typically quantify social interactions governed by market pricing 
norms, often in monetary fashion.  In these cases, individuals do not rely on reciprocity but 
rather on financial incentives to get what they want from others.  Thus, offering an explicit 
financial reward for whistle-blowing quantifies how much an employer values a whistle-
blower’s information and communicates to the worker the employer’s belief about the level of 
money required to purchase the desired information.  Offering an explicit financial reward 
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implies that that social norms of market pricing should govern workers’ whistle-blowing 
decisions rather than those of equality matching.  As such, the potential to receive a financial 
reward may drive workers to behave more self-interestedly than they would have had the 
employer not offered a financial reward.   
Cynicism generally wins when uncertainty exists about whether workers behave pro-
socially for reasons of personal gain or due to concern about their employer’s welfare.  Benabou 
and Tirole (2006) argue that, “agents’ pro-social behavior…reflects an endogenous and 
unobservable mix of three motivations: intrinsic, extrinsic, and reputational, which must be 
inferred from their choices and the context.”  Offering an explicit financial reward for whistle-
blowing makes it difficult for a worker and employer to interpret whether intrinsic pro-social 
motives or financial opportunism motivated the worker to blow the whistle.  This in turn clouds 
workers’ true motivation.  As Benabou and Tirole (2006) explain, “rewards amplify the noise, 
leading observers (or a retrospecting individual) to attribute less of a role to intrinsic motivation 
in explaining variations in behavior.”  
Employers do not need to offer workers a financial reward in order for workers to believe 
that market pricing social norms should govern their whistle-blowing decisions.  Within 
experimental contexts, List and Levitt (2007) argue that the design of participants’ choice sets 
(i.e., experimenter’s decisions about the options available to participants and the choices they can 
make in the experiment) can affect how participants interpret the social norms that should govern 
their interactions and decisions.  Consequently, manipulating whether employers have the ability 
to offer workers an explicit financial reward for whistle-blowing may significantly influence how 
individuals perceive the social norms governing whistle-blowing and subsequently how they 
behave when they observe misconduct.  Within an experimental context, simply allowing 
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employers to offer a financial reward could cause both employers and workers to believe that 
offering a whistle-blowing reward is socially normative behavior, which in turn would lead 
employers to offer financial rewards and workers to expect them in exchange for whistle-
blowing. 
As described in Section 2.3, researchers commonly view whistle-blowing primarily as 
pro-social behavior intended to help others.  Thus, employers might not offer workers whistle-
blowing rewards because, while financial rewards increase workers’ financial motivation to blow 
the whistle, explicitly rewarding whistle-blowing could crowd out workers’ non-financial 
motivation.  With severe crowding out, employers could suffer one of two negative outcomes by 
offering financial rewards for whistle-blowing.  First, they could induce less whistle-blowing by 
offering an insufficient financial reward to overcome the negative effect of crowding out on 
workers’ willingness to whistle-blow.  Second, offering an explicit financial reward could induce 
similar or higher levels of whistle-blowing relative to not doing so, but employers could also find 
the level of reward required to overcome crowding out exceeds the incremental financial benefit 
attributable to inducing more whistle-blowing.  In sum, offering token rewards may induce less 
whistle-blowing than offering no reward at all, and, if workers are especially greedy, employers 
may find that the level of reward necessary to increase whistle-blowing exceeds the incremental 
benefits obtained.  
2.5.2 Alternative Arguments Against Offering Whistle-blowing Rewards  
Besides conventional economic agency theory and the motivation crowding theory reviewed 
above, several other explanations might explain why employers rarely offer whistle-blowing 
rewards.  I now briefly discuss these alternative explanations and why I have chosen not to focus 
on them in my study.  First, many employers may lack sufficient resources or expertise to 
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administer a formal whistle-blower reward program. Such a constraint would result in a social 
setting similar to the Cannot Reward condition I study, in which employers cannot offer a 
whistle-blowing reward and workers do not expect them to do so.  However, this explanation 
appears less plausible when considering the significant financial resources employers expend to 
combat misconduct.  Further, if this explanation actually drove employer behavior, we would 
expect employers with significant financial resources at their disposal and greater administrative 
expertise to be more likely to offer explicit financial rewards for whistle-blowing.  However, 
employers generally do not offer such rewards regardless of their size. 
Second, if firms incur significant costs to investigate allegations of misconduct, 
employers may not wish to offer whistle-blowing rewards for fear that doing so will encourage 
workers to make baseless or “weak” allegations in the hope of obtaining a reward.  However, if 
workers only receive a reward when employers make a recovery, then this mitigates concerns 
about baseless allegations because workers have no financial incentive to falsely accuse a 
colleague of misconduct.  Further, employers can always threaten to penalize workers who make 
baseless allegations, which should deter baseless allegations.  What about cases in which the 
worker has less than perfect certainty that misconduct has occurred, but nonetheless has 
suspicions?  Employers could design a mix of rewards and penalties to ensure that such workers 
only blow the whistle when they possess a certain amount of confidence in the quality of their 
private information about misconduct.  While introducing penalties complicates incentive 
contracting and likely distorts the level of whistle-blowing away from the first-best, this fact 
alone seems unlikely to account for why employers would forgo offering workers explicit 
financial rewards for whistle-blowing.     
34 
 
Third, employers may worry that offering a reward will distort workers’ effort allocation 
and use of time away from other desired tasks.  To the extent that workers must exert costly 
effort to observe misconduct or choose to devote time to “snooping around” to uncover it, 
employers may have concerns that this will result in too little effort and time spent on other 
productive activities that the employer values.  As pointed out by Holmstrom and Milgrom 
(1991), the structure of workers’ compensation influences not just how much time and effort 
they expend on their jobs, but also how they choose to allocate their time and effort.  In some 
cases, distortions in the allocation of effort can lead employers to choose not to condition 
compensation on a desired behavior, such as whistle-blowing, even if they could do so.  This 
explanation is more compelling than the preceding alternatives.  However, it has two 
weaknesses.  First, employers can adjust the level of any whistle-blowing reward to mitigate 
undesired distortions in effort allocation.  If employers worry that rewarding whistle-blowers 
will result in workers expending too much effort to detect misconduct, then they can decrease the 
level of financial reward relative to other areas of compensation for the worker.  However, 
decreasing the level of reward does not imply that employers should forgo offering rewards 
entirely.  Second, employers generally do not offer whistle-blowing rewards even in settings 
with fairly complete contracting.  Thus, even when little uncertainty exists concerning how 
workers allocate effort, employers still do not appear to offer whistle-blowing rewards.      
Fourth, employers may also have concerns that financially rewarding pro-social behavior 
will weaken their reciprocal relationship with workers.  Kuang and Moser (2009) find that a 
reciprocity-based incomplete contract can lead to as high a firm profit as one that relies on a 
theoretically optimal complete contract.  As described earlier in this chapter, employers can 
obtain many positive benefits from fostering a reciprocity-based work environment besides 
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whistle-blowing (see Cascio 2006).  If an employer has chosen to use incomplete contracts and 
to rely on a reciprocity-based work environment, the employer may worry that offering financial 
rewards for whistle-blowing will lead workers to expect contingent financial remuneration for 
acting pro-socially in other domains, such as providing unobservable effort.  However, many 
firms do not rely heavily on reciprocity-based incentive contracts, and thus this explanation does 
not account for why these firms forgo offering whistle-blowing rewards.  Likewise, many 
employers often rely on a mix of both fixed and conditional financial incentives to induce 
desired behavior. Thus, it appears that fixed compensation in one domain can co-exist with 
conditional compensation in other domains.   
My study’s experimental design rules out each of these four alternative explanations for 
why employers might not offer financial rewards for whistle-blowing.  First, employers incur no 
cost to investigate allegations of misconduct, and no other transaction costs exist that would 
preclude them from offering explicit financial rewards for whistle-blowing.  Second, workers 
know with certainty when misconduct occurs, and employers’ investigations into misconduct 
reveal it with certainty.  Third, workers who accept their wage offer in my study provide a fixed 
level of effort.  Thus, offering a reward cannot distort workers’ effort allocation.  Fourth, once 
workers accept a wage offer, their only other choice is whether to blow the whistle when they 
observe misconduct. As such, offering a reward for whistle-blowing cannot affect workers’ 
expectations about how employers should compensate them for other tasks because they perform 
no other task once they accept the wage offer.   
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3.0 AN ANALYTICAL MODEL OF WHISTLE-BLOWING 
 
3.1 OVERVIEW OF CHAPTER 
In this chapter, I develop analytical theory that incorporates gift exchange, motivation crowding, 
and whistle-blowing into one model.  I begin in Section 3.2 with a brief overview of the 
experimental setting I use later to test my hypotheses and research questions.  I then derive 
equilibrium predictions under conventional economic assumptions of behavior.  Specifically, I 
assume employers and workers are fully rational, self-interested, wealth-maximizing economic 
agents.    
Then, in Section 3.3, I extend the analysis by incorporating behavioral theory into the 
setting, which incorporates other-regarding, non-financial preferences into individual utility 
functions.  This in turn leads to a role for both explicit financial rewards and for gift wages.  I 
derive equilibrium conditions under which an employer would prefer to rely on one approach 
versus the other (i.e., on a financial reward versus a gift wage) to induce whistle-blowing.  I 
formulate a behavioral model in order to incorporate insights from psychology and behavioral 
economics into a classic analytical framework.  The analysis proceeds in a non-technical fashion 
without formal lemmas or technical proofs.  Nonetheless, the analysis should provide readers 
with greater insight into the social dynamics between employers and workers that affect whistle-
blowing.  These social dynamics in turn affect an employer’s optimal approach to induce 
whistle-blowing.  However, difficulty in mathematically quantifying the magnitude of behavioral 
effects limits the analysis, which in turn makes it difficult at times to clearly predict behavior.  
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Nonetheless, my behavioral model provides a good foundation that allows a greater 
understanding of the hypotheses and research questions I subsequently develop in Chapter 4.   
 
3.2 EXPERIMENTAL SETTING AND DERIVATION OF CONVENTIONAL 
ECONOMIC PREDICTIONS 
 
3.2.1 Experimental Setting 
My experimental setting consists of one benchmark condition and two treatment conditions (i.e., 
a 1 x 3).  Neither internal misconduct nor whistle-blowing can occur in the control condition (No 
W/B condition).  However, in the two treatment conditions (Cannot Reward and Can Reward 
conditions), employers probabilistically suffer loss from an internal theft that their workers 
privately observe.  If workers choose to blow the whistle, then their employers recover the 
amount stolen with certainty; however, if workers choose to remain silent then their employers 
never know that a theft occurred nor do they recover their losses.  Workers can report theft only 
when a theft actually occurred (i.e., no false allegations allowed).   
In all three conditions, employers select a wage to offer their workers in exchange for a 
fixed level of productive effort and can choose to offer a wage above workers’ cost of effort (i.e., 
a gift wage).  In the treatment conditions, such gift wages may promote goodwill and supplement 
workers’ pre-existing non-financial motivation to whistle-blow.  In the Cannot Reward 
condition, employers offer their worker a wage only, whereas in the Can Reward condition 
employers offer their worker a wage but, in addition, can also credibly offer a financial reward 
for whistle-blowing if they wish.   
In the both the Cannot Reward and Can Reward conditions, workers who observe theft 
can blow the whistle or remain silent and bear no financial cost, such as from retaliation, if they 
do blow the whistle.  Whistle-blowers in the Cannot Reward condition receive no financial 
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benefit from reporting theft, but whistle-blowers in the Can Reward condition receive any 
financial reward offered by their employer.  Thus, employers in the Cannot Reward condition 
must rely on workers’ non-financial motivation to induce whistle-blowing because the lack of 
reward makes workers financially indifferent between blowing the whistle and remaining silent.  
In contrast, employers in the Can Reward condition can rely on workers’ non-financial 
motivation, financial self-interest, or on some combination of the two to induce whistle-blowing.  
The No W/B and Cannot Reward conditions differ only with respect to whether theft and whistle-
blowing can occur, whereas the Cannot Reward and Can Reward conditions differ only with 
respect to the possibility of offering/receiving an explicit financial reward for whistle-blowing. 
The Can Reward condition has the benefit of allowing employers to decide how to 
structure workers’ incentives to induce whistle-blowing and maximize welfare.  However, 
employers’ decisions about how to structure whistle-blowing incentives may be unnaturally 
salient to employers and workers.  Levitt and List (2007) argue that the decisions participants 
make within laboratory settings can affect their perceptions about what constitutes normatively 
appropriate behavior (see also Bardsley 2005 and List 2007 for related empirical evidence).  As 
explained earlier, employers rarely offer whistle-blowing rewards in practice and workers neither 
encounter them as part of their job nor do they appear to expect them.  Thus, while the Can 
Reward condition reflects the natural setting in allowing employers to decide how to structure 
whistle-blowing incentives, the salience of this decision could cause employers and workers to 
view a whistle-blowing reward as expected.  As such, I expect that many employers in the Can 
Reward condition will choose to offer a reward, even though they can forgo doing so.  To 
provide a realistic benchmark against which to compare behavior in the Can Reward setting, I 
use the Cannot Reward condition.  Participants in this condition receive no mention of the 
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possibility of a financial reward for whistle-blowing nor can they offer/receive such a reward.  
Thus, similar to the current natural setting, a financial reward plays no role in the social 
interactions between employers and workers, and instead non-financial motivation, such as 
worker goodwill toward the employer, drives workers’ whistle-blowing decisions.   
Linking back to concepts developed in Chapter 2, these two treatment conditions in effect 
manipulate whether a social norm of market pricing (Can Reward condition) or equality 
matching (Cannot Reward condition) governs interactions between employers and workers with 
respect to whistle-blowing.  That is, employers in the Can Reward condition quantify the value 
they believe workers are willing to accept in exchange for providing information about 
misconduct, and workers who observe theft either “accept” the employer’s offered price (i.e., the 
reward) by blowing the whistle or reject it by remaining silent.  This leads to a norm of market 
pricing in which employers and workers explicitly negotiate the exchange of information for 
money as two self-interested parties.  In contrast, workers’ provision of information about 
misconduct in the Cannot Reward condition is not predicated upon the receipt of money, but 
rather on workers’ non-financial motivation to blow the whistle, which employers can strengthen 
by paying generous wages.  As such, because employers do not explicitly quantify the value of 
workers’ information about theft nor exchange money for it, this condition fosters a social norm 
of equality matching as opposed to market pricing.    
3.2.2 Derivation of Conventional Economic Predictions 
I now derive the economic equilibrium for all three conditions using conventional economic 
assumptions of human behavior.  Specifically, I assume that individuals are rational, self-
interested, and wealth-maximizing.  I also assume that only two arguments comprise individual 
utility functions; utility for wealth and disutility for providing costly effort.  Further, I assume 
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these two arguments are additively separable in any individual’s utility function.  Recent work 
(e.g., Henrich et al. 2001) suggests that these two assumptions have limited generalizability to 
the natural setting and that other inputs besides wealth and effort aversion often factor into 
individual utility functions.  These other inputs may include other-regarding preferences such as 
preferences for fairness or reciprocity (Fehr and Gachter 2000).   
Despite these potential concerns about generalizability, deriving equilibrium predictions 
using conventional economic theory remains a useful exercise.  Such derivations strengthen my 
study’s internal validity because it ensures that conventional economic reasoning cannot explain 
any observed departure from the predicted equilibrium (Brown et al. 2009), thus ruling out a 
potentially confounding explanation for my results.  Also, by deriving the economic equilibrium 
for each condition, I can ensure that each condition yields an identical expected equilibrium, 
which allows me to directly compare the economic outcome for one condition to that of another 
condition.   
As a preview, the conventional economic analysis below yields five key results: (i) 
employers will offer workers the minimum possible wage that covers workers’ fixed cost of 
effort (i.e., employers will not offer gift wages); (ii) workers will accept all wage offers (i.e., no 
unemployment will occur); (iii) employers will not offer a financial reward for whistle-blowing 
in the Can Reward condition; (iv) workers who observe theft will always blow the whistle; and 
(v) employers will obtain a “first-best” outcome in all conditions and payoffs will not differ 
among the three experimental conditions.  The predictions that employers will not expend 
incremental financial resources to induce whistle-blowing and that workers will nonetheless 
always choose to blow the whistle on observed misconduct hinge upon the assumption that 
workers who are financially indifferent between blowing the whistle and remaining silent will 
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always choose to blow the whistle.  I assume weakly indifferent workers will prefer to whistle-
blow because doing so increases employer welfare at no cost to the worker, which is a common 
assumption in analytical research.  Because workers (i) incur no cost to blow the whistle and (ii) 
cannot gain financially from remaining silent about another worker’s misconduct, employers do 
not need to insure workers against retaliation or expend incremental resources to induce them to 
blow the whistle.
8
   
I begin the analysis by deriving the equilibrium for the No W/B condition in which no 
misconduct occurs and workers do not blow the whistle.  I assume employers are risk-neutral, 
which allows me to equate the employer’s expected utility with his expected profit without loss 
of generality.  I also assume workers are weakly risk-averse.  The employer offers the worker a 
fixed wage (w) in exchange for a fixed level of productive effort that costs the worker (e) to 
provide, where w ≥ e > 0.  Denote the worker’s utility function as Uw where Uw = (w – e)
α
, where 
0 < α ≤ 1.  The parameters for α ensure that the worker’s utility function is concave, indicating 
both (weak) risk-aversion and diminishing marginal utility for wealth.  For simplicity, I model a 
setting in which the worker has no choice over the effort provided but rather must provide a 
fixed amount upon accepting the employer’s wage offer.  The effort the worker provides 
generates a low level of revenue (πl) with probability (pl) and generates high revenue (πh) with 
probability (1 – pl), where 0 < πl < πh.  The employer does not observe the actual level of revenue 
generated but the worker does. If the worker rejects the employer’s wage offer, the employer 
receives no revenue, and the worker receives no wage.  Denote the employer’s utility as Up.  In 
                                                          
8
 The general results hold when workers incur costs to blow the whistle except that in such cases employers must 
insure the whistle-blower against the costs incurred.  However, the employer would not need to expend any financial 
resources to induce whistle-blowing beyond the cost of insuring the whistle-blower.  In other words, the employer 
must insure whistle-blowers against financial loss but need not them promise financial gain to induce whistle-
blowing. 
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this setting, the employer’s objective function is to maximize his expected utility subject to 
ensuring that the worker accepts the employer’s wage offer: 
 
   
 
   (     )  [(    )    ]      
Subject to: 
Worker’s IR constraint: 
(  )  (   )
  (    )  [(   )
 ]    
 
Solution: 
Note that the employer need not satisfy any incentive compatibility constraint for the 
worker because once the worker accepts the wage then the worker must provide a fixed level of 
productive effort.
9
  Likewise, the worker receives no wage should he reject the employer’s wage 
offer.  Thus, the employer must simply ensure that the worker prefers, at least weakly, to accept 
rather than reject the wage offer.  The wage w = e satisfies the worker’s IR constraint as an 
equality, ensuring the worker weakly prefers working to not working.  The employer’s utility 
clearly decreases in w, so any wage offer of w > e provides the employer with lower expected 
welfare than offering w = e.  As such, the optimal wage for the employer to offer is w = e.  
I now derive the economic equilibrium for the Can Reward condition.  Assume the same 
setting as for the No W/B condition, but now assume that when revenue equals πh, with 
probability pt another individual besides the worker steals [πh – πl], the difference between the 
high and low levels of revenue.  The worker privately observes any such theft that occurs.  When 
                                                          
9
 This is economically equivalent to a setting in which the employer can observe the worker’s effort with certainty 
and can therefore impose a forcing contract on the worker.  For the sake of simplicity, I assume workers who accept 
the employer’s wage offer automatically provide the requisite level of effort demanded by the employer in exchange 
for the wage.  
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the worker observes a theft, the worker can choose to blow the whistle, which allows the 
employer to recover the amount stolen [πh – πl] with certainty, or the worker can choose to 
remain silent.  If the worker remains silent, the employer does not recover the loss.  Now assume 
the employer chooses a wage and reward (w*, r*) to offer the worker that will maximize the 
employer’s expected utility.  If and only if the worker blows the whistle, the employer will pay 
the worker a financial reward (r) in addition to the worker’s wage (w), where (πh – πl) ≥ r ≥ 0. By 
assumption, workers cannot blow the whistle unless they have observed a theft.
10
  
In my setting, employers always improve their welfare by inducing workers to accept 
rather than reject their wage offer and also by inducing workers to blow the whistle on 
misconduct rather than remain silent about it.  The employer desires to maximize his expected 
utility (i.e., expected payoff) subject to ensuring that the worker has sufficient incentive to accept 
the mix of wage and reward offered by the employer (the IR constraint) and sufficient incentive 
to report theft when observed rather than remain silent (the IC constraint).  Given the information 
above, the employer’s objective function is: 
 
   
   
   (     )  (    )   [   (    )  (    )    ]     
Subject to: 
Worker’s IR constraint: 
(  )  (   )
  (    )  [   (     )
  (    )  (   )
 ]    
Worker’s IC constraint:                                               
   (     )  (   )                                
                                                          
10
 This assumption less restrictive than it might at first appear.  In the natural setting, whistle-blowers receive 
financial rewards only when the information they report leads to a recovery of losses.  This mitigates concerns about 
false allegations for the sake of receiving a reward.  However, as discussed later, if workers have imperfect 
information about the likelihood a theft occurred (i.e., they have suspicions but not hard evidence) then mitigating 
false allegations become more important to the employer.   
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Intuitive Discussion of the Solution: 
 The compensation package (w = e, r = 0) satisfies the worker’s IR and IC constraints as 
equalities.  Therefore, workers offered this compensation package will accept the employer’s 
employment offer and will choose to blow the whistle when they observe theft.  Further, workers 
obtain no information rent from their private information about theft.  Given that the (weakly) 
risk-averse agent bears no risk and earns no information rent, the employer obtains a first-best 
solution.  Finally, this solution is unique for two reasons.  First, r = 0 is a necessary condition to 
ensure the worker bears no risk in compensation (i.e., to satisfy w + r – e = w – e).  Offering r > 
0 imposes risk on the worker, which by implication cannot result in a first-best outcome.  Thus, 
any combination of (w, r) in which the employer offers a strictly positive reward will be less 
efficient than offering no reward because it imposes unnecessary risk on the worker and does not 
increase the level of predicted whistle-blowing.  Second, at r* = 0, any w > e results in lower 
welfare for the employer because the employer pays a higher wage than at w = e but obtains no 
expected benefit from doing so because workers provide a fixed level of effort for any offer 
accepted and will always choose to accept the compensation package (w = e, r = 0). 
 Finally, note that the optimal compensation package for the Can Reward condition (w = 
e, r = 0) must equal the optimal compensation package for the Cannot Reward condition.  This 
arises because by definition the level of reward in the Cannot Reward condition is r = 0, which 
equals the optimal level of reward in the Can Reward condition.  In sum, it is optimal for 
employers who can offer a financial reward for whistle-blowing to forgo doing so and offer a 
wage equal to the fixed cost of effort (e) the worker incurs by accepting the employer’s offer.  
Thus, precluding employers from offering a reward will not decrease their expected welfare or 
affect either party’s expected behavior under conventional economic assumptions.   
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The identical equilibrium prediction for the two treatment conditions hinges on the 
assumption that indifferent workers will choose to blow the whistle because they have no 
financial incentive not to do so and whistle-blowing increases employer welfare.  Some may 
view this as a “knife’s edge” equilibrium because, ex ante, purely self-interested economic 
agents have no incentive to take even costless actions to improve a principal’s welfare.  
However, even if we assume that financially indifferent workers always choose to remain silent 
rather than whistle-blow, the resulting optimal compensation package remains quite similar to 
the one obtained under conventional assumptions.  Specifically, the employer’s optimal solution 
in such a setting is to offer the smallest possible reward that is strictly positive (i.e., a token 
reward).  Doing so provides workers with a strict, rather than a weak, financial incentive to blow 
the whistle and thus ensures that they blow the whistle.  Therefore, employers will never offer 
more than the minimum possible reward, even when assuming that workers will not blow the 
whistle without a reward.   
Likewise, the assumption that financially indifferent workers only blow the whistle when 
offered a reward seems far-fetched when one considers that workers in the natural setting 
commonly blow the whistle when they have no expectation of receiving a reward.  Thus, 
assuming that weakly indifferent workers always blow the whistle appears more defensible and 
realistic than assuming that they never do so.  Further, costly whistle-blowing does not change 
the nature of the solution derived above.  To the extent that whistle-blowing carries a personal 
cost for the worker, the employer’s optimal strategy expends only those financial resources 
sufficient to make a whistle-blower “whole” (i.e., provides the worker with insurance).  In such 
cases, employers still have no need to offer incremental compensation to workers to try to induce 
whistle-blowing.   
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Conventional economic theory suggests that employers will not offer financial rewards to 
induce whistle-blowing as long as they can credibly insure whistle-blowers against retaliation or 
other costs.  Under assumptions that financially indifferent workers remain silent about 
misconduct, employers may offer a nominal or token reward to provide some slight financial 
incentive to induce whistle-blowing.  This prediction is consistent with observations of the 
natural setting, in which firms rarely offer workers explicit financial rewards for whistle-
blowing.  Thus, employers may not offer workers whistle-blowing rewards because they believe 
doing so inefficiently uses financial resources.  If workers have pre-existing non-financial 
motivation to blow the whistle, perhaps because of morality or goodwill toward their employer, 
then they may report information about observed misconduct to their employer at no incremental 
cost.  Consequently, offering a financial reward would pay workers for information about 
misconduct that they would otherwise provide for free.  Employers who already offer gift wages 
to workers to induce other types of desired behavior may be able to rely on only the goodwill 
generated by the gift wage to induce whistle-blowing or may only need to increase its level by a 
modest amount to foster further goodwill and induce more whistle-blowing. 
 
3.3 BEHAVIORAL ANALYSIS OF WHISTLE-BLOWING 
3.3.1 Behavioral Analysis of Cannot Reward Condition 
In this section, I extend the economic analysis presented in Section 3.2 by incorporating notions 
of worker goodwill and motivation crowding.  Specifically, I relax the assumption that workers 
are strictly self-interested and instead assume that their propensity to blow the whistle increases 
in both the level of goodwill they have toward their employer and the level of financial resources 
their employers provide them.  Incorporating these ideas makes the employer’s optimization 
problem more generalizable to the natural setting, but it also makes it less mathematically 
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tractable.  As such, this section does not contain formal proofs but rather shows how motivation 
crowding and worker goodwill might affect the way in which employers prefer to expend 
financial resources to induce whistle-blowing.  
 Consider the Cannot Reward setting, in which employers cannot offer a whistle-blowing 
reward and workers do not expect them to do so.  Previously, I assumed that workers would 
accept a wage offer as long as doing so provided as much expected utility as rejecting the offer 
and also that only wealth and effort-aversion comprised workers’ utility functions.  Because 
workers provide a fixed level of effort, the minimum wage at which the worker chooses to work 
equals the cost of the effort, (e), that the worker provides upon accepting the offer.  Further, 
though workers remain financially indifferent between whistle-blowing and remaining silent, 
conventional economic theory assumes that they will choose to blow the whistle because this 
improves employer welfare.   
 Given that workers provide effort (e) at a fixed cost, we can map their reservation utility 
directly to their wage (i.e., order utility in terms of wage).  Let k equal the worker’s privately 
known reservation wage.  That is, let k signify the wage level below which the worker rejects the 
employer’s wage (i.e., when w < k) and accepts the offer otherwise (i.e., when w ≥ k).  Only the 
worker knows k and the worker cannot credibly communicate it to the employer.  My 
conventional model assumes workers’ reservation wage equals their fixed cost of effort (i.e., k = 
e).  However, as discussed in Chapter 2, prior findings in gift exchange suggest that employers 
must often offer workers more than their cost of effort to induce wage acceptance.  This implies 
that workers’ true reservation wage exceeds their cost of effort (i.e., k > e). 
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The worker will accept any wage offer, w, that satisfies w ≥ k > e.  Thus, even if w > e, 
the worker will reject the offer if w < k.  I illustrate this in Figure 1 below: 
 
 
 
        
Figure 1:  Worker’s wage acceptance decision 
 
Now assume that workers who accept the wage offer of w decide to blow the whistle only 
if they have sufficient non-financial motivation to do so.  Gift exchange suggests that employers 
can rely on the social norm of reciprocity and that workers will reciprocate high wages with 
more pro-social behavior; that is, employers can increase worker goodwill by offering higher 
fixed wages.  Therefore, I assume that workers’ propensity to blow the whistle on internal 
misconduct increases in the level of goodwill they have toward their employer.  Thus, assume 
that worker goodwill monotonically increases in the employer’s wage offer of w.   
Just as a reservation wage k exists for each worker, let δ denote the wage level at or 
above which workers will choose to blow the whistle rather than remain silent, where δ ≥ k.  
That is, for all w ≥ δ, the worker will not only accept the employer’s wage offer, but the wage 
level will induce sufficient goodwill toward the employer that the worker will also choose to 
blow the whistle if the worker observes misconduct.  However, for wage offers where k ≤ w < δ, 
the worker will accept the wage offer but will choose to remain silent rather than blow the 
whistle.  As before, for wage offers w < k, the worker will reject the employer’s wage offer.   
Figure 2 illustrates the worker’s decision to accept or reject the wage offer and to blow the 
whistle or remain silent about misconduct in the Cannot Reward condition: 
e k 
Reject Wage Offer Accept Wage Offer 
w 
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Figure 2: Worker’s decisions: Cannot Reward condition 
 
 
Note that under conventional economic theory any wage that exceeds the cost of effort 
constitutes a “gift wage,” with the size of the gift equaling (w – e).  The difference (k – e) equals 
the portion of the gift wage employers pay to induce wage acceptance while the difference (w – 
k) equals the portion of the gift wage employers pay to induce whistle-blowing.  So long as the 
gift wage premium required to induce whistle-blowing does not exceed the expected financial 
benefit from doing so, then employers should pay the premium (i.e., employers should always 
pay δ when [δ - k] ≤ pt * (πh – πl)).   Within an actual population of workers, there will be a 
distribution of both reservation wages for wage acceptance and for whistle-blowing (i.e., a 
distribution of k’s and δ’s).  From these distributions, employers can construct a joint probability 
distribution that shows, as a function of wage offer, the probability that a randomly selected 
worker will (i) accept a wage offer and (ii) blow the whistle on observed misconduct.   
3.3.2 Behavioral Analysis of the Can Reward Condition  
The analysis of the previous section holds for situations in which social norms of equality 
matching govern whistle-blowing.  What happens when the social norms of market pricing 
govern whistle-blowing?  In such cases, workers no longer view whistle-blowing as pro-social 
act influenced by their goodwill toward employers but rather as self-interested act done for 
money, and they likely expect employers to offer a financial reward regardless of the level of gift 
wage the employer offers.  As such, while paying an incremental gift wage to induce whistle-
blowing might reflect optimal in the Cannot Reward condition, such a strategy might prove sub-
e k 
Reject w 
Accept w but do not 
W/B 
w 
δ 
Accept w and W/B 
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optimal in the Can Reward condition.  The key question centers upon the expected cost of the 
reward employers must offer to induce whistle-blowing when market pricing norms govern 
behavior relative to the incremental gift wage they must offer when equality matching norms 
govern behavior (i.e., δ – k).  I explore this further below. 
In the Cannot Reward setting, I could map each unique wage level, w, to a unique utility 
level the worker would obtain from that wage on a one-to-one basis.  I could do this because 
workers provided effort (e) at a fixed cost, and thus their utility varied only due to their wage 
level.  However, in the Can Reward condition I can no longer map each wage to a unique level 
of utility on a one-to-one basis because employers have an additional degree of freedom when 
structuring compensation.  Specifically, employers in the Can Reward condition can offer 
different combinations of wages and rewards that nonetheless provide workers with identical 
expected utility.  Thus, these employers will seek to offer that particular combination of (w, r) 
that induces workers to accept the wage offer and blow the whistle at the lowest expected cost to 
the employer.      
 In the Can Reward condition, employers must make a two-dimensional decision 
regarding (w, r) instead of a one-dimensional decision about w.  The expected cost to the 
employer of offering a particular (w, r) package equals the sum of the wage, w, and the expected 
cost of the reward.  The expected cost of the reward equals the level of the reward multiplied by 
the probability of theft (pt*r).  Thus, the total expected compensation cost of offering (w, r) 
equals the sum [w + pt*r].   Employers can combine wage and reward levels in multiple ways to 
yield the same level of expected compensation cost.  Figure 3 illustrates some various 
compensation isoquants, in which each diagonal line shown represents all combinations of wage 
and reward levels that yield the same level of expected compensation cost to the employer: 
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Figure 3:  Expected compensation isoquants 
 
In Figure 3 isoquants that fall further from the origin imply higher expected 
compensation costs to employers, and consequently lower expected profits.  As such, the 
employer would like to stay as close to the origin as possible subject to inducing workers to 
accept the wage offered and to blow the whistle in the event they observe misconduct.  Doing so 
minimizes the employer’s expected compensation cost.  However, for a given level of expected 
compensation, risk-neutral employers remain indifferent to the specific combination of wage and 
reward they offer.  That is, risk-neutral employers care about the distance of a compensation 
isoquant from the origin rather than the precise location of their (w, r) offer on the isoquant.   
Bowles and Polania-Reyes (2012) posit that “categorical crowding out” can occur when 
conditional financial incentives alter individuals’ perception of the nature of a situation.  This 
occurs because offering financial incentives can cause moral disengagement and make 
individuals more self-interested by inducing a market mentality toward whistle-blowing.  
Likewise, offering financial rewards can signal to workers a belief by employers that they lack 
sufficient intrinsic motivation to report observed misconduct.  To illustrate categorical crowding 
Wage
Reward
e 
0 
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out, I assume that, just as workers reject a wage offer below k, workers in the Can Reward 
condition will also choose to remain silent rather than blow the whistle when the employer offers 
a reward of less than λ, where λ  > 0.  They will do so regardless of the level of wage employers 
offer them because market pricing norms decouple the link between worker goodwill and 
whistle-blowing.  Under market pricing norms, workers establish a minimum level of reward 
they are willing to accept in exchange for their private information about misconduct. Just as for 
other types of goods, if the price that employers offer is too low, no exchange takes place.  
Specifically, if r < λ, then workers remain silent, but blow the whistle for r ≥ λ.     
Below, Figure 4 extends Figure 3 by incorporating two important compensation 
thresholds and shows the optimal (w*, r*) the employer should offer when workers expect 
financial remuneration for whistle-blowing.  First, I show the effect of the reward threshold, λ > 
0, on the isoquant map. For any reward level where r < λ, the worker will choose to remain silent 
when observing theft regardless of the magnitude of the wage offer w.  Thus, employers will 
wish to ensure that they do not offer a reward below λ (i.e., the employer wishes to remain on or 
above λ line).  Note that this implies the optimal offer in the Cannot Reward condition, w = δ and 
r = 0, cannot remain optimal once workers begin to expect a reward because workers will not 
blow the whistle if employers offer them only a wage and no reward.   
Second, I show k, the “wage threshold” below which workers will reject the employer’s 
wage offer in the Cannot Reward condition.  Recall that in the Cannot Reward condition, each 
unique wage, including k, can be mapped to a unique level of utility for the worker.  As such, a 
wage offer of k in effect offers workers sufficient additional utility such that they accept the 
employer’s wage offer.  Given greater flexibility in structuring compensation, how should 
employers in the Can Reward condition structure their (w, r) offers to provide workers with 
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sufficient incentive to accept the wage offer?  Though insufficient to induce whistle-blowing by 
itself, offering a wage of k represents the minimum wage workers will accept when r = 0.  To 
induce wage acceptance, employers could offer workers a wage of less than k while offering 
incrementally higher compensation in the form of a reward.  However, given risk-averse 
workers, such a strategy clearly costs employers more than simply offering a wage of k to ensure 
wage acceptance. Thus, employers will not impose risk on risk-averse workers simply to induce 
wage acceptance.   
In order to induce wage acceptance and whistle-blowing at the lowest expected cost, 
employers in the Can Reward condition should offer (w = k, r = λ), which I label as χ on Figure 
4.  All compensation offers that fall within the area (w ≥ k, r ≥ λ) will induce both wage 
acceptance and whistle-blowing, but χ is optimal because it does so at the lowest expected cost to 
employers (i.e., χ lies closest to the origin). 
 
 
 
Figure 4:  Effect of reward and wage thresholds on expected compensation costs 
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Reward
λ 
k δ 
χ 
54 
 
3.3.3 Comparison of Can Reward and Cannot Reward Conditions 
Consider the case, as shown in Figure 4, in which χ in the Can Reward condition lies on the 
same compensation isoquant as the optimal δ wage in the Cannot Reward condition.  In such a 
case employers would have identical expected compensation costs and, consequently, identical 
expected welfare across the Can Reward and Cannot Reward settings.  Consequently, employers 
would be indifferent between offering χ in the Can Reward setting and offering δ in the Cannot 
Reward setting.  However, due to categorical crowding out, employers in the Can Reward 
condition could not simply substitute δ for χ without lowering their expected welfare because 
workers in the Can Reward condition will not blow the whistle unless offered a reward of at least 
λ.   
The relative cost of relying on financial versus non-financial motivation to induce 
whistle-blowing depends critically on the minimum reward workers demand (i.e., λ) in the Can 
Reward condition relative to the incremental gift wage required to induce whistle-blowing in the 
Cannot Reward condition (i.e., δ – k). Consider the reward threshold λ1 shown below in Figure 5.  
At this λ-threshold, the optimal compensation package is χ1, which consists of (k, λ1).  However, 
χ1 lies on a compensation isoquant further out from the origin than the isoquant on which δ rests, 
which suggests employers will incur higher expected compensation costs than if workers 
perceived non-financial motivations should govern their whistle-blowing.  In other words, λ1 
indicates workers demand too much compensation for whistle-blowing under market pricing 
norms, and thus the employer will prefer to foster equality matching norms, which frame 
whistle-blowing as selfless rather than self-interested behavior.   
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Figure 5:  Effect of various reward thresholds on employers’ preferred setting 
 
The opposite holds at the reward threshold denoted by λ2.  Here, χ2 falls on a lower 
expected compensation isoquant than δ.  At χ2, market pricing norms still lead workers to behave 
in a self-interested fashion, but the cost of appealing to their self-interest with a reward is less 
than the cost of increasing their non-financial motivation by offering higher gift wages.  Thus, 
neither incentive approach clearly results in higher employer welfare but rather the employer’s 
preferred approach depends upon how social norms influence the compensation workers require 
in order to whistle-blow.   
 What can we say about the original λ-threshold at which employers remain indifferent 
between offering a gift wage of δ in the Cannot Reward condition and a wage/reward package of 
χ in the Can Reward condition?  Recall that, by definition, the worker will always blow the 
whistle when w = δ in the Cannot Reward condition and when χ(w, r) = (k, λ) in the Can Reward 
condition.  That is, the employer can theoretically induce complete whistle-blowing using both 
approaches, and thus their preference between the two hinges upon the relative cost of using 
each approach.  Given identical incremental benefits of inducing whistle-blowing, employers 
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remain indifferent in their preferred incentive approach when the expected cost of inducing 
whistle-blowing under one approach equals the expected cost of doing so under the other 
approach.  This implies: 
 
(1a)     (   ) , or 
 
(1b)       ( ) 
 
(1c)          
 
 In the Can Reward condition, the incremental cost to induce whistle-blowing equals the 
expected value of the reward payable to a whistle-blower (i.e., pt * λ).  Recall that employers in 
this condition find it inefficient and ineffective to induce whistle-blowing by offering higher gift 
wages.  In the Cannot Reward condition, the cost to induce whistle-blowing is the incremental 
gift wage offered by the employer specifically to induce whistle-blowing (i.e., δ - k).  Thus, the 
employer primarily cares about whether the required gift wage premium to induce whistle-
blowing in the Cannot Reward condition exceeds or is exceeded by the expected cost of the 
reward required to induce whistle-blowing in the Can Reward condition.   Note that the base rate 
of theft affects the expected cost of the reward (λ) paid for whistle-blowing but not the gift wage 
premium (δ – k) because workers receive the gift wage premium unconditionally but receive λ 
only when they observe theft and blow the whistle, which they will always do for a reward of λ. 
Recall that δ represents the minimum wage at which workers will blow the whistle in the 
Cannot Reward condition, while k represents the minimum wage workers will accept.  As such, 
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the difference (δ – k) represents a measure of the strength of workers’ intrinsic whistle-blowing 
motivation.  If workers have strong intrinsic motivation to blow the whistle, then employers must 
pay only relatively small gift wage premiums to induce whistle-blowing (i.e., δ – k is small).  As 
such, employers become more likely to prefer paying (δ – k) to offering a reward when (δ – k) is 
“small” because offering a reward would crowd out a large amount of intrinsic motivation, 
resulting in the loss of too much “free” whistle-blowing.   
In contrast, if workers have weak intrinsic motivation to blow the whistle (i.e., if δ – k is 
relatively large), employers must pay significant incremental gift wages to increase workers’ 
non-financial motivation to blow the whistle.  In these cases, employers become more likely to 
find it too expensive to use gift wages to increase whistle-blowing and instead will prefer to offer 
a reward.  Though a reward will crowd out workers’ intrinsic whistle-blowing motivation, in 
such cases workers possess little intrinsic motivation to begin with.  As such, the employer 
“sacrifices” only a small amount of free whistle-blowing.   
   Paying an unconditional wage premium to all workers in the Cannot Reward condition 
increases worker goodwill and induces reciprocity.  First, it increases worker goodwill because 
the employer guarantees every worker a whistle-blowing wage premium even though not every 
worker will observe theft, which indicates to the worker that the employer will sacrifice wealth 
to the worker even if the employer receives no gain for doing so.  Second, it induces positive 
reciprocity because, by paying a wage premium unconditionally, the employer places implicit 
trust in the worker, which likely prompts workers to positively reciprocate by blowing the 
whistle when they observe theft.  If the minimum incremental gift wage that induces whistle-
blowing is less than the expected cost of the minimum reward necessary to induce whistle-
blowing, then the employer will prefer the gift wage approach. 
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Finally, Equation (1c) suggests employers will prefer offering gift wages to induce 
whistle-blowing when:   
(1c)          
We can re-arrange (1c) to show: 
(1d)     
   
 
 
Equation (1d) suggests a simple rule for determining the employer’s preferred incentive 
approach.  When the base rate of theft is greater than the ratio of the gift wage premium (δ - k) to 
the reward (λ), employers will prefer to use gift wages.  When it is less, they will prefer to offer 
financial rewards for whistle-blowing.  Workers’ endogenous social preferences determine each 
input on the right-hand side of Equation 1d (δ, k, and λ).  By assumption, exogenous forces 
determine the base rate of theft pt.  Thus, employers can compare workers’ endogenous 
preferences to a single exogenous benchmark to determine which approach they should use to 
induce whistle-blowing at the lowest expected cost. 
 Equation (1d) also implies that, as the level of theft increases, relying on gift wages to 
induce whistle-blowing becomes relatively more attractive to employers than relying on rewards.  
In designing the study, I set the base rate of theft (pt) to equal 50%, which does not bias in favor 
of either approach and thus biases against finding differences across approaches.  My initial 
study does not assess how varying the base rate of theft affects employer welfare but rather 
examines whether, for a given level of theft, employers obtain different levels of welfare based 
on the incentive approach they use.  As discussed in the conclusion, future studies may wish to 
examine how variation in the base rate of theft particular affects the relative optimality of each 
incentive approach.    
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 As discussed in Section 7.4, the model I develop here is subject to certain limitations. 
However, the key limitation, and one I discuss here, is that I do not incorporate a strategic role 
for workers who are considering whether to commit internal misconduct.  Instead, workers 
always commit misconduct whenever revenue is high and never do so when revenue is low.  
However, in both the conventional and the behavioral model developed above, the optimal 
incentive contract induces the worker to always blow the whistle, which in turn should fully 
deter any worker from attempting to commit misconduct to begin with. Thus, some readers may 
question why my model incorporates no endogenous choice to commit misconduct or why, if 
workers will always blow the whistle on internal misconduct, a worker would ever attempt to 
commit it.   
The purpose of my analysis is to examine the direct effects of financial incentives on 
whistle-blowing behavior, rather than their indirect effect at deterring misconduct. For analytical 
convenience, my model assumes that workers have perfect information about misconduct and 
always observe it when it occurs and also assumes that employers’ can conduct costless 
investigations that uncover any misconduct with certainty.  In the natural setting, these 
assumptions are less likely to hold.  As such, when information is imperfect or investigations are 
costly, workers may find it in their self-interest to commit misconduct from time to time, perhaps 
playing a mixed strategy in which they probabilistically commit misconduct in order to 
maximize their welfare.  My study has a more narrow focus in that I do not attempt to analyze 
the indirect effect of each approach on deterring misconduct but rather seek to isolate the direct 
effects of offering financial incentives on workers’ whistle-blowing behavior.  As such, in both 
this model and my experiment I take misconduct as a given, exogenous feature of the setting I 
analyze.  Future analytical research could enrich the model developed here by relaxing some of 
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the assumptions I incorporate such as perfect knowledge of theft or perfect investigations, which 
in turn would likely provide more of a strategic role for workers considering whether to commit 
misconduct.   
I do not believe restricting the strategic decision-making of the would-be thief 
significantly limits the implications of the current model for predicting workers’ whistle-blowing 
behavior.  Yes, the contracting relationship between the employer and the worker will certainly 
affect the strategic decisions of an individual considering whether to commit misconduct.  
However, the indirect effect of the employer’s incentive approach on the would-be thief’s choice 
of whether to steal is consistent in direction with the direct effect of the incentive approach on 
the worker’s choice to blow the whistle.  That is, to the extent that one incentive approach may 
dominate the other in terms of inducing more whistle-blowing, it will also dominate the other in 
terms of deterring theft from occurring in the first place.  As such, any empirical differences I 
find when comparing the incentive approaches would likely be amplified if I allowed strategic 
behavior on the part of the would-be thief.   
 Despite the limitation described above, two key implications arise from the model above, 
which would likely hold in future extensions of the model that incorporate strategic behavior 
from the would-be thief.  First, neither incentive approach clearly dominates the other.  Offering 
a financial reward to induce whistle-blowing or offering an incrementally larger gift wage can be 
optimal depending on the social norms that govern interactions between employers and workers.  
Second, each approach is mutually exclusive of the other.  That is, employers will not attempt to 
rely both on financial rewards and on incrementally larger gift wages to induce whistle-blowing 
but rather motivation crowding leads them to fully commit to one approach at the exclusion of 
the other.    
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4.0 DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESES AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
4.1  OVERVIEW OF CHAPTER 
This chapter develops my hypotheses and research questions related to employer welfare, 
compensation costs, workers’ whistle-blowing behavior, and motivation crowding.  My study 
focuses on whether employers can obtain higher welfare by offering financial rewards for 
whistle-blowing, and as such Section 4.2 develops a related research question.  Employer welfare 
is a function of employers’ expected compensation costs and the financial benefit they receive 
from workers’ whistle-blowing.  I address each of these in separate sub-sections.  Section 4.3 
develops a research question and two hypotheses related to employer compensation costs while 
Section 4.4 develops a research question and hypothesis related to workers’ whistle-blowing 
behavior across conditions and their underlying motivation for whistle-blowing.   
 
4.2 EMPLOYER WELFARE ACROSS APPROACHES 
My primary question concerns whether employers could improve their welfare if they offered 
their workers a financial reward for blowing the whistle rather than relying on non-financial 
motivation.  As discussed in Chapter 3, from an analytical perspective it remains unclear, for a 
given rate of theft, whether one approach will more cost-effectively induce whistle-blowing.  The 
relative effectiveness of relying on non-financial motivation depends upon the strength of 
workers’ pre-existing non-financial motivation and the ease with which employers can foster 
worker goodwill through the use of gift wages.  Likewise, the relative effectiveness of relying on 
financial rewards depends upon how strongly financial rewards crowd out workers’ non-
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financial motivation and how strongly it fosters a market mentality among workers.  To the 
extent that offering an explicit financial reward results in motivation crowding, the beneficial 
direct effect of offering a financial reward on workers’ propensity to whistle-blow is offset by 
the negative indirect effect of crowding out their non-financial motivation to whistle-blow.  As 
such, it remains unclear whether offering an explicit financial reward will increase or decrease 
employer welfare relative to relying only on worker’s non-financial motivation to whistle-blow.  
Thus, I pose the following research question: 
RQ1. Do employers earn higher payoffs when they offer workers a financial reward for 
whistle-blowing relative to when they do not?  
As discussed at the end of section 3.3.3, employers’ preference for offering a financial 
reward to induce whistle-blowing decreases in the rate of theft while their preference for offering 
gift wages to induce whistle-blowing increases in the rate of theft.  However, the level of theft at 
which employers’ preferences switch remains unclear because the actual level of theft at which 
employers remain indifferent between incentive approaches also depends upon the behavioral 
thresholds of workers described in Chapter 3.  My dissertation focuses on the relative size of 
these behavioral thresholds for a given level of theft.  Therefore, I set the rate of theft to equal 
50%, which equals the mid-point of the set of possible base rates for theft and thus biases against 
finding differences across approaches in employer welfare.       
 
4.3 THE COST OF INDUCING WHISTLE-BLOWING 
Conventional economic theory predicts that any strictly positive reward will suffice to induce 
whistle-blowing.  However, as discussed in section 2.5, offering a small financial reward for pro-
social behavior may actually lead to more anti-social behavior (here, more silence) if workers 
view the reward as too small.  Small financial incentives for pro-social behavior may back-fire 
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by crowding out intrinsic motivation to act pro-socially while providing insufficient extrinsic 
motivation to do so.  Intuitively, therefore, appealing to workers’ self-interest and opportunism to 
induce whistle-blowing would appear to cost employers more than appealing to their goodwill.   
From this perspective, the level of wages and rewards offered in the Can Reward condition could 
exceed the level of wages offered in the Cannot Reward condition. 
While employers who offer a financial reward for whistle-blowing clearly bear an 
incremental cost when they pay out the reward, those who do not offer a financial reward also 
likely incur incremental costs but in a more subtle form.  Presuming that workers intrinsically 
have goodwill toward their employers is potentially naïve.  As reviewed in Chapter 2, prior 
studies on gift exchange show that employers often try to strengthen workers’ preferences to act 
pro-socially by offering them gift wages (see, e.g. Charness and Kuhn 2011).  Workers who 
receive gift wages generally reciprocate by providing additional costly effort (e.g., Fehr et al. 
1993, Hannan et al. 2002, Hannan 2005, Kuang and Moser 2009) or stealing less (Greenberg 
1990, Zhang 2008, Chen and Sandino 2012).  That is, gift wages successfully foster workers’ 
goodwill toward their employers and induce them to make costly sacrifices to improve their 
employers’ welfare.    
In my study, workers can potentially reciprocate a gift wage with a gift of information 
that they can provide at no cost.  Their willingness to do so likely depends upon the level of 
goodwill that they have toward their employers, which employers can increase by offering them 
higher gift wages.  Thus, mean wage offers in the Cannot Reward condition will likely exceed 
those in the Can Reward condition because employers in the Cannot Reward condition must rely 
solely on workers’ goodwill to induce whistle-blowing.    
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Each approach to inducing whistle-blowing carries its own incremental costs.  In the Can 
Reward condition, employers likely offer workers a substantial reward for whistle-blowing, but 
they actually pay the reward only when their workers observe theft and blow the whistle.  In the 
Cannot Reward condition, employers likely offer their workers a relatively higher level of gift 
wage to foster more worker goodwill.  However, unlike with a reward, employers pay these 
higher gift wages regardless of whether their workers observe theft or blow the whistle.  Thus, I 
cannot predict whether offering versus not offering a financial reward for whistle-blowing results 
in higher expected total compensation costs (w + pt*r) for employers.  Therefore, my second 
research question is: 
RQ2. Are employers’ expected compensation costs higher when they offer workers a 
financial reward for whistle-blowing relative to when they do not? 
 I can make two directional predictions regarding the level and structure of workers’ 
compensation, both of which are consistent with the analytical model I develop in Chapter 3.  
First, employers likely expend some incremental level of financial resources in order to induce 
workers to blow the whistle on observed misconduct.  Employers in both conditions will likely 
offer gift wages to ensure workers accept their employment offers because acceptance alone 
increases employer welfare.  However, I also expect employers to offer additional incremental 
compensation specifically to induce whistle-blowing.  In the Cannot Reward condition, this must 
take the form of incremental gift wages, which foster worker goodwill, while in the Can Reward 
condition employers could offer higher gift wages and/or a reward.  To isolate the incremental 
wage employers offer specifically to induce whistle-blowing, I can compare the mean wage offer 
when theft can occur (i.e., in the Can and Cannot Reward conditions) to the mean wage offer 
when no theft can occur and thus employers have no need to induce whistle-blowing (i.e., in the 
No W/B condition).  Thus, I make the following prediction: 
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H1.  To induce whistle-blowing, employers will offer workers higher compensation when 
misconduct is possible than when it is not possible.  
 Second, my analysis in Chapter 3 suggests employers who choose to offer a financial 
reward for whistle-blowing should not offer any incrementally higher fixed compensation in the 
form of higher wages.  Rather, they should offer only the wage level they believe just suffices to 
induce workers to accept the wage offer and should not offer higher fixed wage offers to induce 
whistle-blowing.  In effect, once employers decide to offer a financial reward, they should 
anticipate it will result in crowding out workers’ non-financial motivation and therefore will 
abandon any attempt to foster such non-financial motivation.  Thus, I predict the following:  
H2.  Employers who offer a financial reward for whistle-blowing will not offer incremental 
fixed compensation specifically to induce whistle-blowing.  
 
4.4 WORKERS’ WHISTLE-BLOWING BEHAVIOR 
Both offering a financial reward and offering gift wages likely induce workers to blow the 
whistle.  However, I cannot predict that one approach will induce more whistle-blowing than the 
other.  Indeed, my model assumes that employers can fully induce whistle-blowing under both 
approaches.  Offering a financial reward for whistle-blowing provides workers with a strict 
financial incentive to blow the whistle, though workers with a strong market mentality may still 
choose to remain silent rather than blow the whistle if they view the employer as having offered 
a stingy reward.  Relying on workers’ non-financial motivation and fostering goodwill could 
induce a similar level of whistle-blowing because: (i) employers typically can ensure their 
workers bear no cost to blow the whistle on internal misconduct, and (ii) employers can increase 
workers’ wages to foster worker goodwill without crowding out workers’ pre-existing non-
financial motivation to blow the whistle.  However, workers who have little goodwill toward 
their employer or lack non-financial motivation to whistle-blow incur no opportunity cost by 
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choosing to remain silent, thus making fixed compensation in this respect a “weaker” incentive 
relative to a financial reward.  Thus, my third research question is: 
RQ3.  Does the rate at which workers blow the whistle depend upon whether they are 
offered a financial reward for whistle-blowing?  
 As stated in Chapter 3, offering explicit financial rewards for whistle-blowing decouples 
the link between worker goodwill and whistle-blowing.  Rather, offering explicit financial 
incentives for behaving pro-socially often induces a market mentality among workers, who no 
longer view the behavior as other-regarding but self-interested.  Thus, when workers find 
themselves in a social setting in which employers can financially reward whistle-blowers, the 
level of reward offered likely influences their decision to blow the whistle more than the level of 
their wage.  Thus, I make the following prediction: 
H3.  When workers can receive a financial reward for whistle-blowing, wage levels have 
less influence on their whistle-blowing decisions than when they cannot receive a reward.  
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5.0 RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
5.1 OVERVIEW OF CHAPTER 
This chapter describes the experimental design and procedures used to test my hypotheses and 
research questions.  Section 5.2 provides an overview of the experimental setting and design.  
Section 5.3 describes the experiment’s participants, procedures, and three experimental 
conditions in more detail.  Section 5.4 discusses the calculation of participant payoffs. 
 
5.2 OVERVIEW OF EXPERIMENT 
I test my hypotheses and research questions using a 1 x 3 between-subjects design with 
two treatment conditions in which misconduct and whistle-blowing can occur (Can Reward and 
Cannot Reward conditions) and one control condition in which no misconduct or whistle-
blowing occur (No W/B condition).  As described below, in all three conditions employers make 
wage offers to workers in exchange for a fixed amount of productive effort that generates 
revenue for the employer.  In the two treatment conditions, with a 50% probability workers who 
accept the wage offer privately observe a co-worker steal a portion of their employer’s revenue.  
In the Can Reward condition, employers could offer workers a financial reward in exchange for 
blowing the whistle on the theft, but they could not do so in the Cannot Reward condition.  In the 
No W/B condition, employers make wage offers to workers for productive effort but theft does 
not occur, and thus workers cannot blow the whistle.  As explained in the results, I use the No 
W/B condition to further analyze data from the Can Reward and Cannot Reward conditions.             
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5.3 PARTICIPANTS AND EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES 
5.3.1 Participants  
118 individuals participated in one of six experimental sessions (two sessions per condition), 
with 40 participants each in the Can Reward and Cannot Reward conditions and 38 in the No 
W/B condition.
11
  I recruited participants as volunteers from the participant pool of an 
experimental economics lab at a large university and completed the study using zTree software 
(Fischbacher 2007) on private computer terminals located within the lab.  Each session lasted 
about one hour and consisted of 10 periods, except for one session of the No W/B condition, 
which consisted of 9 periods.
12
  As explained in Section 5.4, participants’ payoffs depended on 
their decisions and the decisions of others during the experiment.  At the end of the experiment, a 
participant drew one period at random, which served as the payment period.  Participants 
privately received their payoff for that period.  Payoffs averaged $14.97, including a $5 
participation fee, and ranged from $5 to $27.     
Participants had a mean age of 24.0; had mean full-time work experience of 2.8 years; 
had completed a mean of 1.9 courses in economics; and men comprised 43% of the sample.  An 
ANOVA indicates no significant differences exist (p > 0.10) between the three conditions in 
gender balance, work experience, or number of economics courses completed.  I do find 
significantly older participants in the Cannot Reward versus Can Reward condition (t = 2.8, p < 
0.01, two-tailed).  However, the statistical inferences presented in the next chapter do not change 
when I control for this difference. 
 
 
                                                          
11
 All sessions had 20 participants except for one No W/B session in which only 18 individuals participated.   
12
 Because only 18 individuals participated in one No W/B session (see Footnote 10), my turnpike design (described 
below) limited the number of periods for this session to 9 to ensure unique pairings of employers with workers.  
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5.3.2 Experimental Procedures 
Prior to the start of a session, I randomly assigned participants to the role of either an employer 
or a worker, and this assignment remained fixed for the duration of the session.  I used a turnpike 
design (Cooper 1996) to pair each employer with a new worker in each period to prevent 
contagion effects and reputation formation.  Participants knew each pairing would occur no more 
than once, and anonymous pairings ensured that they never knew the identity of the other 
participant in their pair.  Figure 6 provides a timeline for the steps followed in the experiment, 
which I detail below.   
 In Step 1, employers in all three conditions decided on a wage to offer their worker.  
Employers made wage offers to their worker in order to obtain a fixed amount of productive 
effort from the worker that generates revenue for the employer (further details provided below).  
Employers could offer from $4 to $20, inclusively.
13
  In the Can Reward condition, employers 
also decided whether to offer a reward in exchange for whistle-blowing.  Employers who wished 
to offer a reward could offer from $0.50 to $10 in $0.50 increments.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
13
 The minimum and maximum wage ensures workers and owners received no less than their $5 participation fee.   
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Figure 6:  Experimental procedures and timeline 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Step 1 Step 1 Step 1
Employers: Employers: Employers:
● Select Wage Offer ● Select Wage Offer ● Select Wage Offer
Step 2 Step 2 Step 2
Workers: Workers: Workers:
● Observe Wage Offer ● Observe Wage Offer ● Observe Wage Offer 
● Accept/Reject Wage Offer ● Accept/Reject Wage Offer
● Accept/Reject Wage Offer
 SKIP Step 3
Step 4
Employers and Workers:
● Observe own and other's 
payoffs● Employers observe any whistle-blowing report
Workers:
● Observe revenue level
● If observe theft, choose to report it or remain silent
Step 4 (all)
Employers and Workers:
● Observe own and other's payoffs
Step 3 (Only if offer accepted)
CANNOT REWARD 
CONDITION
CAN REWARD 
CONDITION NO W/B CONDITION
● Select amount of reward, if 
any, for whistle-blowing 
● Observe amount of reward, 
if offered
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In Step 2, the worker observed the employer’s wage offer and either accepted or rejected 
it.  In the Can Reward condition, workers also observed any reward the employer offered for 
whistle-blowing.  If employers chose not to offer a reward, then workers received no mention of 
a reward.  Likewise, in the Cannot Reward and No W/B conditions, neither employers nor 
workers received any mention of a reward because employers could not offer one.
14
  Workers 
who accepted the employer’s wage offer automatically provided a fixed amount of productive 
effort at a cost of $4.  Employers and workers knew that a worker’s effort would generate 
departmental revenue for an employer of either $20 or $30 with equal probability and also that 
random drawings would determine the actual level of revenue generated.
15
  Workers who 
rejected the employer’s wage offer incurred no cost of effort and employers received no 
departmental revenue.     
In the Can Reward and Cannot Reward conditions, workers who accepted the wage offer 
in Step 2 proceeded to Step 3 in which they learned the level of departmental revenue for the 
period ($20 or $30), but their employers did not.  For cases in which departmental revenue 
equaled $30, workers were informed that a co-worker had stolen $10 of the revenue from their 
employer.  These workers then indicated whether they wished to blow the whistle to their 
employer (i.e., report the theft) or remain silent.  If a worker chose to report the theft, the 
employer recovered the stolen $10 of revenue with certainty.  If a worker chose to remain silent, 
employers could not recover the stolen $10 of revenue, never learned that they incurred a loss 
from theft, and instead received revenue of $20 instead of $30.  Thus, workers could remain 
credibly silent because employers only learned about a theft if the worker chose to report it, and 
                                                          
14
 This did not draw undue attention to the absence of any reward, which more closely reflects the natural setting.   
15
 Prior to the experiment, a private random drawing with replacement determined whether the worker’s effort for 
the period would generate revenue of $20 or $30.  For each period, there was a 50% chance that either level of 
revenue would occur.  This resulted in six periods with revenue of $30 (3, 5, 7, 8, 9, and 10) and four periods with 
revenue of $20 (1, 2, 3, and 6).  Period 10 was not run in the No W/B session that had 9 periods (see Footnote 11). 
72 
 
employers could never force workers to blow the whistle.  Workers in the No W/B condition 
skipped Step 3 and went to Step 4 because theft did not occur in this condition, and therefore 
they could not blow the whistle.        
In Step 4, employers and workers observed a final payoff screen.  This screen disclosed 
whether the worker had accepted or rejected the employer’s wage offer; the level of departmental 
revenue received by the employer; a whistle-blowing notification if the worker blew the whistle 
(in the Can Reward and Cannot Reward conditions), and the respective payoffs of the employer 
and the worker (described below).  A new period then began with new, unique pairings of 
employers and workers.  After the final period, all participants completed a post-experimental 
questionnaire (PEQ) and received their compensation privately. 
 
5.4 CALCULATION OF PARTICIPANT PAYOFFS 
Figure 7 shows the calculation of participants’ payoffs.16  When a worker rejected an employer’s 
wage offer, neither the worker nor the employer had any earnings for that period.  When workers 
accepted the employer’s wage offer, workers and employers received earnings as described 
below.  
                                                          
16
 For simplicity, Panel B does not include participants’ $5 participation fee, though each participant received one. 
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Figure 7: Payoff calculations for workers and employers 
 
(1) If worker rejects  employer's wage offer:
Worker Payoff: $0
Employer Payoff:  $0
(2) If worker accepts  employer's wage offer:
Worker's Payoff:
No W/B Condition :  Wage Offer - $4 (Cost of Effort)
Cannot Reward Condition :  Wage Offer - $4 (Cost of Effort)
Can Reward Condition :
(i) Worker observes theft and blows whistle:  Wage Offer - $4 (Cost of Effort) + Reward (if offered by Employer)
(ii) Worker observes theft and remains silent OR does not observe theft:  Wage Offer - $4 (Cost of Effort)
Employer's Payoff:
No W/B Condition :  Revenue generated ($20 or $30) - Wage Offer
Cannot Reward Condition:
(i) Worker blew the whistle:  $30 - Wage Offer
(ii) Worker did not blow the whistle:  $20 - Wage Offer 
Can Reward Condition:
(i) Worker blew the whistle:  $30 - Wage Offer - Reward (if offered)
(ii) Worker did not blow the whistle:  $20 - Wage Offer 
*For simplicity, participants' $5 participation fee is not shown in the payoff calculations.
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5.4.1 Worker Payoffs  
As shown in Figure 7, workers who accepted an employer’s wage offer always received their 
wage less a $4 cost of effort.  However, in addition to their wage, workers in the Can Reward 
condition who blew the whistle also received any reward their employer offered. 
5.4.2 Employer Payoffs 
As also shown in Figure 7, employers in the No W/B condition always received the actual level 
of revenue generated less the wage offered to their worker.  In the Cannot Reward and Can 
Reward conditions, employers did not know the actual level of revenue generated but knew that 
it equaled either $20 or $30 with equal probability and also knew a $10 theft would occur with 
certainty if it equaled $30.  If their worker observed theft and blew the whistle, employers were 
informed of both the theft and the worker’s whistle-blowing.  Further, they recovered the $10 of 
stolen revenue with certainty, thus receiving $30 in total revenue.  If, however, their worker 
remained silent about the theft, employers received only $20 of revenue, were not informed 
about the theft, and therefore could not infer whether the actual level of revenue generated 
equaled $30 or only $20.  Consequently, employers could not determine if a theft occurred 
unless their worker blew the whistle.  Employers in the Can Reward condition also paid any 
whistle-blowing reward offered to workers who blew the whistle in addition to the worker’s 
wage.  As explained in Chapter 3, conventional economic theory suggests employers and 
workers will make identical decisions across the Can Reward and Cannot Reward conditions, 
and that all payoffs will be identical across all three conditions.    
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6.0 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
 
6.1 OVERVIEW OF CHAPTER 
This chapter presents descriptive statistics concerning my results as well as statistical tests of my 
hypotheses and research questions. Section 6.2 summarizes the decisions employers and workers 
made during the experiment and their respective payoffs.  I divide the formal statistical analysis 
of my hypotheses and research questions into three sections.  First, Section 6.3 provides 
statistical tests comparing employer welfare across the Can Reward and Cannot Reward settings 
(i.e., tests of RQ1).  Second, Section 6.4 provides statistical tests regarding employers’ decisions 
about both the level of compensation to offer workers (i.e., tests of RQ2 and H1) and, within the 
Can Reward condition, the form of compensation (i.e., tests of H2).  Third, Section 6.5 provides 
statistical tests regarding workers’ whistle-blowing behavior (i.e., formal tests of for RQ3 and 
H3).  Section 6.6 provides supplemental analysis of PEQ data that provides additional support 
for the presence of motivation crowding in the Can Reward condition in which employers could 
offer a whistle-blowing reward.  Finally, Section 6.7 briefly summarizes and discusses the 
results. 
 
6.2 SUMMARY OF THE DATA 
I summarize my data into three broad categories.  First, Section 6.2.1 summarizes 
employer behavior.  Specifically, I summarize employers’ average wage offers and, for 
employers in the Can Reward condition, the frequency with which they offered a financial 
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reward and the average level of reward offered.  Second, Section 6.2.2 summarizes workers’ 
decisions about whether to accept the employer’s offer and, when they observed theft, whether to 
blow the whistle.  Third, Section 6.2.3 presents descriptive information regarding employers’ and 
workers’ average respective payoffs.   
6.2.1 Employer Behavior 
Table 1 summarizes employers’ mean wage offers for all conditions and, for employers in the 
Can Reward condition, the mean reward employers chose to offer their worker for whistle-
blowing.
17
  Based on prior work by Levitt and List (2007), I expected many employers to offer a 
reward in the Can Reward condition, and they did so in 88% of cases (n = 176 / 200).
18
  
Employers chose not to offer any financial reward for whistle-blowing in 12% of cases (n = 24 / 
200).  20 of these 24 cases arise from two employers who never offered a financial reward in any 
period.  I categorize the 200 total offers in the Can Reward condition according to whether the 
employer did or did not offer a reward (Reward Offered = 176 cases and No Reward Offered = 
24 cases).  I distinguish offers within the Can Reward condition because I wish to compare the 
effect of offering a financial reward relative to cases in which employers do not offer a reward 
and workers do not expect them to do so.  In the natural setting, workers do not appear to expect 
whistle-blowing rewards, but workers in the Can Reward condition likely expected to receive 
                                                          
17
 Analysis of the data indicates that an employer in the No W/B condition made anomalously large wage offers that 
result in severe outliers and skew the data for that condition.  The employer offered a wage of $19 in the first period 
and the maximum possible wage of $20 in each of the remaining nine periods.  These offers are over 3 standard 
deviations greater than the mean offer in the No W/B condition, and $4-$5 above the next highest wage offer.  For 
purposes of comparison, no other wage offer is more than $2 from the next closest offer.  This employer also made 
wage offers much higher than those commonly observed in related types of bargaining games (e.g., the ultimatum 
game).  Thus, including these offers would distort the true nature of the wage offers that employers made and 
workers’ subsequent acceptance decisions.  To mitigate the effect of this anomalous participant’s decisions and 
present a more representative picture of employer behavior, I exclude data related to this participant from reported 
analyses. 
18
 I allowed this choice because conventional economic theory suggests employers will forgo offering a reward or 
offer no more than the minimum positive amount ($0.50).  Employers appear to have believed that their workers 
would not blow the whistle for the minimum positive reward of $0.50 given that they offered an average reward of 
$3.66.     
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such rewards given the frequency with which employers offered them.  Thus, the expectation of 
a reward likely distorts workers’ behavior in these 24 cases relative to how workers behave in the 
natural setting, and, in addition, these cases do not appear to reflect typical employer behavior 
for this condition.  At times my statistical tests and subsequent discussion refer to a sub-sample 
of cases in the Can Reward condition rather than the full sample for this condition.  When this 
occurs, I append a category label to the condition to distinguish the sub-sample from the full 
sample of cases: the term Can Reward-Reward Offered refers to the 176 cases in the Can 
Reward condition in which the employer offered a reward, while the term Can Reward-No 
Reward Offered refers to the 24 instances in the Can Reward condition in which the employer 
did not offer a reward.  
 
Table 1: Mean (Standard Deviation) of employers’ wage and reward offers 
 
 
From Table 1, employers appear to have made similar mean wage offers across all 
conditions except that the mean wage offer in the Cannot Reward condition ($10.12) appears 
higher than both the mean wage offer in the No W/B ($8.95) condition and Can Reward-Reward 
Offered ($8.97) cases.  Higher wage offers in the Cannot Reward condition suggest that 
…….….........…....….Can Reward……...…........…...….
Reward Offered No Reward Offered Combined
Wage Offer $8.95 $10.12 $8.97 $8.79 $8.95
($1.50) ($1.88) ($2.30) ($3.09) ($2.40)
Reward Offer n/a n/a $4.15 $0.00 $3.66
($1.54) ($0.00) ($1.98)
Expected Costs* $8.95 $10.12 $11.05 $8.79 $10.78
($1.50) ($1.88) ($2.77) ($3.09) ($2.90)
Sample size n = 171 n = 200 n = 176 n = 24 n = 200
*Expected costs = Wage Offer + 50% * Reward Offer
CONDITION
No Whistle-
Blowing 
Cannot 
Reward
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employers attempted to rely on gift exchange to increase worker goodwill and induce more 
whistle-blowing.  Likewise, the similarity in mean offer between the No W/B condition ($8.95) 
and Can Reward-Reward Offered cases ($8.97) suggests employers did not rely on gift exchange 
to induce whistle-blowing.   
I also calculate employers’ expected costs for each condition, which represents the total 
financial resources the employer expects to expend in order to induce acceptance of the offer and 
whistle-blowing.  In the No W/B and Cannot Reward conditions an employer’s expected cost 
simply equals the wage offered to the worker.  In the Can Reward condition, however, the 
employer’s expected costs must incorporate the value of any reward offered.  The expected cost 
of the reward equals the base rate of theft (here, 50%) multiplied by the level of the offered 
reward and, when added to the employer’s wage offer, yields the employer’s expected cost.  
Employers’ expected costs appear highest in the Can Reward-Reward Offered cases ($11.05), 
lower in the Cannot Reward condition ($10.12), and lowest in the No W/B condition ($8.95).  
Thus, though employers who offer a reward do not appear to rely on gift exchange to induce 
whistle-blowing, they appear to incur higher expected costs than their counterparts in the Cannot 
Reward condition.   
6.2.2 Worker Behavior 
Workers made two decisions in my study.  First, in all cases they decide whether to accept or 
reject the employer’s wage offer.  Second, in cases in which the worker accepted the wage offer, 
they observed theft probabilistically and, in such cases, decided whether to blow the whistle or 
remain silent.  Table 2 summarizes workers’ wage acceptance decisions and their whistle-
blowing choices.   
 
 
79 
 
Table 2:  Descriptive summary of workers’ wage acceptance and whistle-blowing 
 
 
From Table 2, workers appear to have accepted wage offers at similar rates in the No W/B 
(90.6%) and Can Reward (89.0%) conditions.  However, wage acceptance rates appear relatively 
lower in the Cannot Reward (82.0%) condition.  To test this, I run an ANOVA with mean wage 
acceptance as the dependent variable and condition as the independent variable.  ANOVAs 
require a continuous dependent variable, but wage acceptance is a dichotomous choice (Accept 
or Reject).  To address this, I calculate the mean rate of wage acceptance for each worker and 
then compare these means by condition using a simple ANOVA.  Using each worker’s mean rate 
of wage acceptance controls for repeated measurements and provides a continuous dependent 
variable with which to run an ANOVA.  The ANOVA indicates that no significant differences 
exist in the mean rate of wage acceptance among the three conditions (F = 1.21, p = 0.31).  
Given that employers could adjust the level of their wage offers based on their beliefs about 
workers’ expectations, it is unsurprising that the rate at which workers accepted wage offers did 
not vary across conditions.   
The random drawing procedure used to determine whether theft occurred used a base rate 
for theft of 50%, but the drawings themselves led to an actual rate of theft of 60%.  A slight 
difference in the actual rate of theft between the Cannot Reward (60.4%) and Can Reward 
…….….........…....….Can Reward……...…........…...….
Reward Offered No Reward Offered Combined
90.6% 82.0% 90.3% 79.2% 89.0%
(155/171) (164/200) (159/176) (19/24) (178/200)
n/a 60.4% 59.7% 63.2% 60.1%
(99/164) (95/159) (12/19) (107/178)
41.4% 94.7% 0.0% 84.1%
(41/99) (90/95) (0/12) (90/107)
CONDITION
No Whistle-
Blowing 
Cannot 
Reward
% of Wage Offers 
Accepted:
% Whistle-Blowing 
Given Theft
n/a
Frequency Theft 
Occurred
80 
 
(60.1%) conditions exists because workers in the Can Reward condition rejected wage offers 
relatively more frequently in periods in which theft would have occurred had they accepted the 
wage offer.  However, this variation did not lead to significant differences in the actual rate of 
theft between the two conditions (Pearson χ2 < 0.01, p = 0.96).  Thus, workers in both conditions 
observed theft at similar rates and had equal opportunity to blow the whistle.   
 Finally, workers blew the whistle over twice as frequently in the Can Reward-Reward 
Offered cases (94.7%) as in the Cannot Reward condition (41.4%).  Also, note that workers who 
observed theft in the Can Reward condition never blew the whistle without a reward—that is, 
workers never blew the whistle in the 12 instances of the Can Reward-No Reward Offered cases 
in which theft occurred.  This suggests the possibility of receiving a financial reward may have 
crowded out workers’ non-financial motivation to whistle-blow.  In sum, it appears that offering 
a financial reward powerfully motivates whistle-blowing relative to offering only a fixed wage.  
Though workers receive wages of $10.12 versus only $8.95 in the Cannot Reward versus Can 
Reward condition, this induced much less whistle-blowing, even though workers incur no cost to 
blow the whistle.    
6.2.3 Employer and Worker Payoffs 
Table 3 summarizes employer and worker payoffs by condition.  Employers averaged the highest 
payoff in the No W/B condition ($14.99), which should be expected given they need not expend 
financial resources to induce whistle-blowing.  The average payoff for employers and workers 
appear higher in the Can Reward-Reward Offered cases ($12.59 and $10.60, respectively) than 
in the Cannot Reward condition ($9.78 and $8.67, respectively).  Further, rejected wage offers 
do not appear to drive the relative ranking of employer and worker payoffs because the ranking 
remains the same when comparing only the wage offers that workers accepted.   
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Employers received the highest average payoff ($18.90) in cases in the Cannot Reward 
condition in which workers blew the whistle. That is, employers consistently received lower 
payoffs in the Cannot Reward condition except for instances in which workers blew the whistle.  
Thus, while it appears that workers blew the whistle more frequently in the Can Reward-Reward 
Offered cases, employers appear to have received higher payoffs from whistle-blowing in the 
Cannot Reward condition.  Thus, it remains unclear whether offering a whistle-blowing reward 
yields higher employer payoffs than not doing so.  Finally, note that workers’ gross payoffs 
(excluding their cost of effort) also appear highest in the Can Reward condition, which suggests 
that offering a reward can lead to Pareto improvements in welfare.   
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Table 3:  Mean employer and worker payoffs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
…….….........…....….Can Reward……...…........…...….
Reward Offered No Reward Offered Combined
All Cases
Employer Payoff $14.99 $9.78 $12.59 $8.08 $12.05
Worker Gross Pay $8.28 $8.67 $10.60 $7.75 $10.26
Sample Size n = 171 n = 200 n = 176 n = 24 n = 200
Wage Offer Accepted
Employer Payoff $16.54 $11.93 $13.93 $10.21 $13.53
Worker Gross Pay $9.14 $10.57 $11.73 $9.79 $11.52
Sample Size n = 155 n = 164 n = 159 n = 19 n = 178
Worker Blew Whistle
Employer Payoff n/a $18.90 $16.47 n/a $16.47
Worker Gross Pay n/a $11.10 $13.53 n/a $13.53
Sample Size n/a n = 41 n = 90 n = 0  n = 90
Worker Remained Silent
Employer Payoff n/a $9.69 $12.80 $11.00 $11.53
Worker Gross Pay n/a $10.31 $7.20 $9.00 $8.47
Sample Size n/a n = 58 n = 5 n = 12 n = 17
No Theft Occurred
Employer Payoff $16.54 $9.52 $10.45 $8.86 $10.30
Worker Gross Pay $9.14 $10.48 $9.55 $11.14 $9.70
Sample Size n = 155 n = 65 n = 64 n = 7 n = 71
Gross Pay excludes $4 cost of effort and $5 participation fee
CONDITION
No Whistle-
Blowing 
Cannot 
Reward
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6.3 EMPLOYER WELFARE ACROSS CONDITIONS 
My first research question asks whether employers earn higher payoffs when they offer workers 
a financial reward for whistle-blowing relative to when they do not.  To test RQ1, I compare the 
mean employer payoff for the 176 Can Reward-Reward Offered cases (mean = $12.59) to the 
mean employer payoff for the 200 cases in the Cannot Reward condition (mean = $9.78).  I 
regress the employer payoffs on an independent indicator variable for condition (Reward = 1 if 
Can Reward-Reward Offered case, = 0 if Cannot Reward condition).  I also include an 
independent indicator control variable for whether the worker accepted the employer’s wage 
offer (Accept = 1 if worker accepts wage, = 0 if rejects) because workers’ wage acceptance 
decision should explain a substantial part of the variation in employers’ payoffs.  Because 
employer and worker decisions jointly affect employers’ payoffs, I cluster observations on each 
unique employer-worker pair and thus obtain a sample size of 376 unique observations. 
 
(1)                                                  
 
I find that β1, the co-efficient on Reward, is significantly positive (β1 = 1.75, t = 4.37, p < 
0.001), indicating that payoffs in the Can Reward-Reward Offered cases significantly exceed 
those in the Cannot Reward condition.  As expected, I also find β2, the co-efficient on Accept, is 
significantly positive (β2 = 12.61, t = 21.9, p < 0.001).
19
  Further, as shown in Figure 8 below, 
employers who offered a whistle-blowing reward earned higher mean payoffs in every period, 
including periods in which theft did and did not occur.  Thus, the beneficial effect of offering a 
reward on employer welfare persists over time and does not appear to depend upon either 
learning effects or whether theft actually occurred.   
                                                          
19
 My statistical inferences remain unchanged when I omit the Accept indicator variable.    
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Figure 8:  Employer payoffs across time 
 
 
I test for period effects using regression (2) below, which runs regression (1) including a 
variable indicating period (Period) and an interaction term between the Period and Reward terms 
(Period*Reward): 
 
(2)                                                                     
 
I find significantly positive signs for both β3, the co-efficient on Period (β3 = 0.22, t = 2.4, p < 
0.02), and also β4, the co-efficient of the interaction term between Period and Reward (β4 = 0.46, 
t = 3.5, p < 0.001).  Thus, while employer payoffs increased over time in both conditions, 
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payoffs increased at a faster rate for employers who offered a reward versus those in the Cannot 
Reward condition.
20
  As such, the disparity in employer payoffs across conditions appears to be 
growing over time. 
  
6.4 EXPECTED COMPENSATION COSTS 
The analysis in Section 6.3 shows that employers receive higher payoffs when they offer their 
workers a financial reward for whistle-blowing.  An employer’s payoff function consists of two 
inputs:  (i) the cost incurred to induce wage acceptance and whistle-blowing and (ii) the financial 
benefit obtained from doing so.  To explore why employers obtained higher payoffs by 
rewarding whistle-blowers, I examine both payoff components.  This section examines 
employers’ decisions about how to compensate workers, while the next section examines 
workers’ whistle-blowing as a function of compensation choices.  
Three parts comprise this section, each of which provides respective tests for RQ2, H1, 
and H2.  All tests relate to employers’ expected costs.  Workers’ actual compensation consists of 
their wage and any reward received for whistle-blowing, but their expected compensation 
consists of the employer’s wage offer plus the expected value of any financial reward the 
employer offers for blowing the whistle.  The expected value of a whistle-blowing reward equals 
the base rate of observing misconduct (here, 50%) multiplied by the value of the reward.  I 
compare expected rather than actual compensation because this better reflects the true level of 
the compensation that employers offer to workers.  Employers make their compensation 
decisions based on the information they have available to them at the time.  In my study, 
employers only know the probability of theft rather than whether a theft actually occurred.  Thus, 
                                                          
20
 Employer payoffs increase over time in part because theft occurred more frequently in the second half of the 
experiment than in the first half.  However, this increase in the frequency of theft cannot account for why the 
disparity in employer welfare between reward conditions increases over time.  
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the expected value of rewards offered in the Can Reward condition better measures the level of 
reward employers expect to pay over time.  In the Cannot Reward condition and Can Reward-No 
Reward Offered cases, the employer’s expected compensation cost equals only the wage offered 
to the worker because employers in this condition do not offer any whistle-blowing reward.   
6.4.1 Test of RQ2  
My second research question asks whether employers have higher expected compensation costs 
when they offer workers a financial reward for whistle-blowing relative to when they do not.  To 
answer this question, I compare the mean expected cost of compensation for the 200 cases in the 
Cannot Reward condition (mean = $10.12) to that for the 176 Can Reward-Reward Offered 
cases (mean = $11.05).  I regress the expected value of the compensation offered to workers on 
Reward, the independent indicator variable condition (Reward = 1 if Can Reward-Reward 
Offered case, = 0 if Cannot Reward condition).  Because one employer makes repeated decisions 
about the level of compensation to offer a worker, I cluster the analysis on employers to control 
for repeated measures.   
 
(3)                                      
  
I find that β1, the co-efficient on Reward, does not differ significantly from zero (β1 = 0.9, 
t = 1.3, p = 0.19, two-tailed).  This indicates that, on an expected basis, employers who offer a 
reward do not offer higher overall expected compensation relative to those in the Cannot Reward 
condition.  Rather, it appears that employers who can offer a reward prefer to offer a similar 
level of total expected compensation relative to employers in the Cannot Reward condition but 
also prefer to incorporate a reward into workers’ pay.  To offset the expected cost of the reward, 
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employers appear to reduce their wage offers:  employers in the Cannot Reward condition 
offered mean wages of $10.12, which appears greater than the mean wage offer of $8.97 for 
employers who offered a reward.
21
   
 Finally, as shown in Figure 9 below, plotting the expected compensation across time 
shows that the disparity between expected compensation actually narrows as employers become 
more familiar with offering financial rewards.  While employers consistently offer quantitatively 
higher expected compensation when they offer a financial reward for whistle-blowing, this 
difference does not differ significantly from zero and actually appears to decrease over time as 
employers become more experienced with offering rewards.   
To check for an interaction over time (i.e., periods), I run regression (3) including an 
indicator variable for Period (Period) and an interaction term between Reward and Period 
(Reward*Period): 
 
(4)                                                                    
 
I find that the interaction coefficient β3 is significantly negative (β3 = -0.22, t = 2.53, p = 0.016, 
two-tailed), which indicates that the already insignificant disparity in expected compensation 
costs decreases over time for employers who offer a reward versus employers in the Cannot 
Reward condition.22   
 
 
                                                          
21
 My statistical inferences remain unchanged when I run regression (3) while combining the 24 Can Reward-No 
Reward Offered cases and the Cannot Reward cases.   
22
 A comparison of expected compensation costs shows the mean expected compensation cost for Can Reward-
Reward Offered cases is significantly higher (t = 1.9, p = 0.06) than the mean for the Cannot Reward condition only 
in the first half of the study. No significant difference exists in mean expected compensation for the second half of 
the study (t = 0.57, p = 0.57). 
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Figure 9:  Mean expected compensation across time 
 
 
 6.4.2 Test of H1  
Hypothesis 1 predicts that, to induce whistle-blowing, employers will choose to offer workers 
higher compensation when misconduct can occur relative to when it cannot occur.  In order to 
isolate the incremental compensation employers offer specifically to induce whistle-blowing, I 
compare employers’ mean wage offer in the No W/B condition to the mean wage offer in the 
treatment conditions (i.e., the combined Can Reward and Cannot Reward conditions).  Because 
employers did not need to induce whistle-blowing in the No W/B condition, any difference in 
mean wages between the No W/B condition and the two treatment conditions must result from 
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employers attempting to induce whistle-blowing.  Thus, comparing the mean wage offer for the 
No W/B condition to the other two conditions allows me to isolate the incremental effect of 
workers’ whistle-blowing ability on employers’ wage offers (see Fehr et al. 1998).   
 To test H1, I compare the 171 observations of employers’ wage offers in the No W/B 
condition (mean wage offer = $8.95) to the 400 combined wage/reward offers from the Can and 
Cannot Reward conditions (mean total expected compensation offered = $10.45, untabulated).   
I regress a dependent variable for the expected value of the compensation offered by the 
employer (Expected Compensation) on an independent variable indicating whether misconduct 
could occur (Misconduct = 1 if theft possible, = 0 if theft not possible).  I control for repeated 
measurements by clustering offers of compensation on the individual employer.   
 
(5)                                           
 
β1, the coefficient on Misconduct, is significantly positive (β1 = 1.5, t = 3.30, p < 0.01), 
which indicates that employers offered incrementally higher compensation specifically to induce 
whistle-blowing. Specifically, to induce whistle-blowing employers offered workers on average 
16.8% more compensation than they did when misconduct and whistle-blowing could not occur, 
or about $1.50 in absolute terms.
23
  Recall that that employers incur expected losses from theft of 
$5 (= $10 theft * 50% probability).  As such, employers offered workers a thirty percent “share” 
($1.50 / $5.00) of the expected recovery from whistle-blowing.   
 
 
                                                          
23
 I calculate this by dividing the difference in the average expected compensation offered when misconduct was and 
was not possible by the average compensation employers offered when misconduct was not possible:  [($10.45 - 
$8.95) / $8.95 ] = 16.8%. 
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6.4.3 Test of H2 
My second hypothesis predicts that employers who offer a financial reward for whistle-blowing 
will not offer incrementally higher fixed wages in order to induce whistle-blowing.  This 
prediction arises from some analytics presented in Chapter 3 in which I demonstrate that 
employers who choose to offer a reward will induce whistle-blowing solely by relying on 
workers’ extrinsic financial motivation and will not attempt to foster workers’ goodwill as a 
means of doing so.  To test H2, I compare the mean of the 176 wages employers offered in the 
Can Reward-Reward Offered cases (mean wage offer = $8.97) to the mean of the 171 wages 
employers offered in the No W/B condition when misconduct and whistle-blowing could not 
occur (mean = $8.95).  I regress a dependent variable for wage offer (Wage) on an independent 
indicator variable for whether misconduct could occur (Misconduct).  I also cluster the 
observations by employer to control for repeated measurements.  
 
(6)                         
 
I find that β1, the co-efficient on Misconduct, does not differ significantly from zero (β1 = 
0.02, t = 0.04, p = 0.97).  This indicates that, on average, employers who offered a whistle-
blowing reward did not also offer higher incremental compensation in the form of gift wages to 
induce whistle-blowing, but rather attempted to induce whistle-blowing solely by offering a 
reward.   
Table 4 shows quartile data for (i) mean wage offers for Can Reward-Reward Offered 
cases; (ii) the mean reward level that corresponds to the wage offered;  (iii) mean expected 
compensation offered (i.e., wage + 50% * reward); (iv) mean wages offered for the combined 
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Cannot Reward condition and Can Reward-No Reward Offered cases; and (v) mean wage offers 
in the No W/B condition.  As shown in Table 4, the quartile means for employers’ wage offers 
appear consistently larger for cases in which employers did not offer a reward relative to cases in 
which they did and, with the exception of the lowest quartile, relative to wage quartile means in 
the No W/B condition.  Also, quartile means for wages offered when employers offered a reward 
appear roughly similar to the quartile means in the No W/B condition.  Thus, it does not appear 
that a narrow segment of employers drove observed behavior.   
The size of a reward offered and the size of a wage offered appear positively correlated.  
A bivariate correlation between wage offers and reward offers confirms a significant positive 
correlation (Pearson correlation = 0.572, p = 0.013, two-tailed, n = 18).
24
  Thus, employers who 
offered workers relatively high rewards also tended to offer a relatively high fixed wage.  Within 
the population of employers, some offer relatively stingy wages while others offer relatively 
generous ones.  The data in Table 4 show that employers in the Can Reward-Reward Offered 
cases who offer relatively generous fixed wages also offer relatively generous rewards for 
whistle-blowing.  This suggests these employers did not view high wages as substitutes for 
offering a large reward but instead believed offering both high wages and high rewards would 
maximize their welfare.  That is, employers did not rely on offering relatively high gift wages to 
induce whistle-blowing, but also offered high rewards along with high wages.  This suggests 
employers within the Can Reward-No Reward Offered sub-sample who offered relatively high 
gift wages had reasons for doing so besides inducing whistle-blowing.   
 
 
                                                          
24
 I control for repeated measurements in the calculation of the correlation as follows.  I calculate the mean wage and 
corresponding mean reward offered for each employer with at least one observation in the sample of 176 cases in 
which employers offered a reward.   I then use these means to calculate the correlation. 
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Table 4:  Compensation offered by wage quartile 
 
 
 
 Finally, I could not predict whether employers who did not offer a reward would offer 
incrementally higher fixed wages in order to induce whistle-blowing.  Employers could simply 
rely on workers’ intrinsic non-financial motivation (e.g., moral preferences) to induce whistle-
blowing.  To test this, I run regression (6) and compare the mean wage offer ($10.12) of the 200 
wage offers in the Cannot Reward condition to the mean wage offer ($8.95) of the 171 wage 
offers in the No W/B condition.  I find that employers in the Cannot Reward condition offered 
significantly higher fixed compensation to induce whistle-blowing, consistent with an attempt to 
induce gift exchange (β1 = 1.17, t = 2.54, p = 0.016, two-tailed).25   
 
6.5 WORKERS’ WHISTLE-BLOWING BEHAVIOR 
6.5.1  Comparing Whistle-blowing Behavior With and Without a Reward 
My third research question asks whether workers blow the whistle more frequently when 
employers offer a reward for doing so relative to when they do not.  Recall from Section 5.4 that 
employers offered similar levels of total expected compensation to their workers regardless of 
whether they offered a reward.  While offering a reward provides a strict financial incentive to 
whistle-blow, offering a high, unconditional fixed wage can foster worker goodwill and also 
                                                          
25
 My statistical inferences remain unchanged when I run the regression while combining the 24 Can Reward-No 
Reward Offered with the 200 Cannot Reward cases.  
Percentile
1% - 25% $6.14 $3.20 $7.74 $7.18 $7.21
26% - 50% $8.25 $3.68 $10.09 $9.54 $8.19
51% - 75% $9.66 $4.86 $12.09 $10.79 $9.65
76%- 100% $11.84 $4.86 $14.27 $12.39 $10.79
Average $8.97 $4.15 $11.05 $9.97 $8.95
Mean wage offer 
No W/B condition
Mean Wage Offer 
with reward
Mean Corresponding 
Reward Offered
Mean Expected 
Compensation 
Mean wage offer 
with no reward
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induce whistle-blowing.  As shown in Panel B of Table 2, the rate of whistle-blowing in the Can 
Reward-Reward Offered cases (94.74%) appears substantially higher than the rate of whistle-
blowing in the Cannot Reward condition (41.41%), and both of these rates exceed the rate (0%) 
of whistle-blowing in the 12 Can Reward-No Reward Offered cases.   
To formally test RQ3, I compare whistle-blowing frequency for the 99 instances of theft 
in the Cannot Reward condition to the whistle-blowing frequency for the 95 instances of theft in 
the Can Reward-Reward Offered cases.  Using a repeated measures logistic regression, I regress 
a dependent indicator variable for whistle-blowing (WB = 1 if worker blew the whistle, = 0 if 
worker remained silent) on the Reward independent indicator variable (Reward = 1 if Can 
Reward-Reward Offered case, = 0 if Cannot Reward).   
 
(7)                 
 
I find that workers blow the whistle significantly more often when employers offer them a 
reward for doing so (β = 3.24, z = 6.44, p < 0.001).   
 Workers may also blow the whistle more frequently when employers offer them a reward 
simply because they receive greater actual total compensation for doing so relative to when 
employers do not offer a reward.  To test this, I run regression (7) above with a control variable 
for the worker’s actual payoff (WorkerPay): 
 
(8)                                       
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While WorkerPay significantly predicts the level of whistle-blowing (β2 = 0.48, z = 4.3, p < 
0.001), the co-efficient on Reward remains statistically significant (β1 = 3.08, z = 5.3, p < 
0.001).
26
  This indicates that the form of compensation provides an incremental effect on 
workers’ whistle-blowing decisions in addition to the level of their actual payoff.  Figure 10 
illustrates this effect by plotting the mean rate of whistle-blowing for cases in the Cannot 
Reward condition and Can Reward-Reward Offered sample in which workers observed theft by 
the amount of workers’ payoff.  
 
 
 
Figure 10:  Mean whistle-blowing frequency by worker compensation 
                                                          
26
 My statistical inferences remain unchanged when I combine the 12 Can Reward-No Reward Offered cases of theft 
with the 99 cases of theft in the Cannot Reward condition. 
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As shown in Figure 10, for every level of worker payoff, workers blew the whistle at 
(weakly) greater rates when employers offered them a reward relative to when they did not.  For 
example, workers who received a fixed wage of $13 blew the whistle less frequently than 
workers who received $13 paid as a combination of wage and reward.  This implies that 
fostering worker goodwill by offering high gift wages is a weaker mechanism to induce whistle-
blowing than offering workers a financial reward.   
6.5.2 Effect of Rewards on the Relationship between Wages and Whistle-blowing 
In H3, I hypothesized that wages have less influence on workers’ whistle-blowing decisions 
when workers can receive a whistle-blowing reward relative to when they cannot.  The basis for 
this prediction was workers are more likely to perceive that norms of market pricing apply to 
whistle-blowing and less likely to perceive that norms of equality matching apply when 
employers can offer them a financial reward.  Market pricing norms should decouple the link 
between wages and whistle-blowing.   
To test this, I examine the 206 cases (99 in Cannot Reward and 107 in Can Reward) in 
which workers observed theft and made a whistle-blowing decision.
27
  I regress workers’ 
whistle-blowing decisions on their compensation and the experimental condition (Can Reward or 
Cannot Reward) in which they made their decision.  Specifically, I regress a dependent indicator 
variable for whether the worker blew the whistle (WB = 1 if worker blew whistle; = 0 if 
remained silent) on (i) the worker’s wage offer (Wage); (ii) an independent  indicator variable for 
cases in the Can Reward condition (CanReward = 1 if Can Reward condition, = 0 if Cannot 
                                                          
27
 Because I am interested in the effect of perceived social norms on worker motivation, I include the 12 cases in 
which employers in the Can Reward condition did not offer a reward in my statistical tests.  
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Reward condition); (iii) an interaction term between wage offer and condition 
(Wage*CanReward); and (iv) a control variable for the level of reward offered (Reward$):
28
 
 
(9)                                                          
  
If crowding out occurs, then the interaction between Wage and CanReward should 
negatively affect whistle-blowing, implying a smaller positive effect of wages on whistle-
blowing in the Can Reward versus Cannot Reward condition.  I find β3, the coefficient on 
Wage*CanReward, is marginally significantly negative (β3 = -0.47, z = 1.89, p = 0.06), 
indicating crowding out occurs and providing support for H3.  This is consistent with categorical 
motivation crowding, in which the effect of wages on whistle-blowing decisions depends upon 
whether workers can receive a whistle-blowing reward.   
Next, I test for simply effects by separately regressing WB on wage (Wage) in the Cannot 
Reward condition and on wage and reward level (Wage and Reward$) in the Can Reward 
condition: 
 
(9a) Cannot Reward:                   
(β1 = 0.33, z = 1.87, p = 0.06) 
 
 
(9b) Reward:                              
(β1 = -0.14, z = 0.77, p = 0.44; β2 = 1.93, z = 4.66, p < 0.001)  
 
 
I find wages have a marginally significant positive effect on whistle-blowing in the Cannot 
Reward condition (p = 0.06) but have no significant effect on whistle-blowing in the Can 
Reward condition after controlling for reward size (p = 0.44).  Thus, it appears that wages affect 
                                                          
28
 I do not include an interaction between Reward$ and CanReward because Reward$*CanReward = Reward$, and 
thus this interaction term is redundant and unnecessary.   
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workers’ whistle-blowing decisions only in the Cannot Reward condition, and the possibility of a 
reward in the Cannot Reward condition crowds out any effect of wages on workers’ whistle-
blowing decisions.  
 
6.6 SUPPLEMENTARY ANALYSIS 
To provide further insight into the relationship between financial rewards and motivation 
crowding, I examine data obtained from a post-experimental questionnaire (PEQ).  As part of the 
PEQ, workers rated the influence of various factors on their willingness to blow the whistle on a 
5-point Likert Scale with endpoints of “Greatly decreased willingness” (-2) and “Greatly 
increased willingness” (+2) and a midpoint of “No influence at all” (0).  This included rating 
how the following affected whistle-blowing:   
(i) The reward the employer offered me was high (Can Reward condition only); 
(ii) The reward the employer offered me was low (Can Reward condition only); 
(iii) The wage the employer offered me was high (both reward conditions); 
(iv) The wage the employer offered me was low (both reward conditions). 
Below, Table 5 shows workers’ mean responses to these PEQ questions. 
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Table 5: PEQ data about workers’ perceived whistle-blowing influences 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Workers' mean responses to the following PEQ question:
Reward No Reward
Factors: (n = 20) (n = 20)
   (1) The reward  the employer offered me was high 1.60 n/a
   (2) The reward  the employer offered me was low -0.75 n/a
High Reward - Low Reward [(1) - (2)] (i) 2.35 n/a
   (3) The wage  the employer offered me was high 0.95 1.40
   (4) The wage  the employer offered me was low -0.70 -1.30
High Wage - Low Wage [(3) - (4)] (ii) 1.65 (iii) 2.70
Tests:
Test (1):  Paired t-test of whether (i) 2.35 > (ii) 1.65 
Test Result:  t = 1.89, p = 0.04, one-tailed
Test (2):  Simple t-test of whether (ii) 1.65 < (iii) 2.70 
Test Result:  t = 2.10, p = 0.02, one-tailed
When you accepted the employer's wage offer and then observed theft, please indicate how each of 
the following factors influenced your willingness to report the theft to your employer (-2 = Greatly 
decreased my willingness, 0 = Had no influence at all, +2 = Greatly increased my willingness):  
Condition
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To gain additional insight into whether the possibility of receiving a reward led to 
motivation crowding among workers, I conduct two tests using a difference-in-difference 
analysis of worker responses to the PEQ questions. The first test comprises a within-subject 
comparison using workers in the Can Reward condition while the second comprises a between-
subjects comparison using workers in both treatment conditions.  First, I test whether workers in 
the Can Reward condition perceived the level of financial reward for blowing the whistle as 
more influential to their whistle-blowing decisions than the level of wage they received.  To test 
this, I use a difference-in-difference analysis using the 20 workers in the Can Reward condition.  
For each worker, I calculate the mean difference in the perceived willingness to blow the whistle 
for a high versus low reward (overall mean = 2.35), which serves as a measure of the perceived 
influence of reward size on whistle-blowing.  Similarly, I calculate the mean difference in the 
worker’s perceived willingness to blow the whistle for a high versus low wage (overall mean = 
1.65), which serves as a measure of the perceived influence of wage level on whistle-blowing.  I 
then conduct a paired t-test of whether reward size exerts greater perceived influence than wage 
level on workers’ whistle-blowing.  I find that workers in the Can Reward condition perceive 
reward size exerts marginally significant more influence than wage level on their whistle-
blowing decisions (t = 1.89, p = 0.08, two-tailed, n = 20).  Thus, the potential for a reward 
appears to weigh more heavily on workers’ whistle-blowing decisions than their wages.   
The second test examines whether workers in the Can Reward condition perceive that 
wage level has less influence on their whistle-blowing decisions than workers in the Cannot 
Reward condition.  To test this, I use a difference-in-difference analysis that compares mean 
responses for the 20 workers in the Can Reward condition to the 20 in the Cannot Reward 
condition.  As I did the prior test for workers in the Can Reward condition, I calculate the mean 
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difference in the worker’s perceived willingness to blow the whistle for a high versus low wage 
in the Cannot Reward condition (overall mean = 2.70).  I then conduct a simple t-test and find a 
significantly smaller (t = 2.10, p = 0.04, two-tailed) overall mean difference in the Can Reward 
condition (overall mean difference = 1.65) than in the Cannot Reward condition (overall mean 
difference = 2.70).  These findings suggest that, when making their whistle-blowing decisions, 
workers in the Can Reward condition focus more on rewards than wages and also have less 
sensitivity to wage variation than workers in the Cannot Reward condition.   
I also ask workers to rate the extent to which their personal moral preferences influenced 
their whistle-blowing choices.  Workers rated the perceived influence on a 5-point Likert scale 
with endpoints of “Greatly decreased willingness” (-2) and “Greatly increased willingness” (+2) 
and a midpoint of “No influence at all” (0).  I find that workers’ perceptions about the effect of 
their personal morals on their whistle-blowing decisions did not differ significantly across 
conditions (t = 0.81, p = 0.42).  This is not necessarily surprising because workers may perceive 
their own intrinsic moral values to be independent of the level of wages or rewards offered to 
them or the social settings in which they interact.   
To test whether these moral preferences influenced workers’ whistle-blowing decisions 
differentially across reward conditions, I average each worker’s rate of whistle-blowing 
conditional upon observing theft, which controls for repeated measurements.
29
  This yields 40 
ratings of perceived moral influence and 40 average rates of whistle-blowing.  Subsequently, I 
then regress a dependent variable for the mean rate of whistle-blowing (WB_Mean) for each 
worker on an independent indicator variable for the Can Reward condition (CanReward = 1 if 
Can Reward condition and = 0 if Cannot Reward condition); an independent variable for the 
                                                          
29
 Every worker observed theft at least once during the course of the study. 
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worker’s perceived influence of personal morality on whistle-blowing (Morality); and an 
interaction term between reward condition and morality rating (CanReward*Morality): 
 
(10)                                                             
  
I find β3, the co-efficient on the interaction between perceived moral influence and 
reward condition, is negative and marginally significant (β3 = -0.22, t = 1.9, p = 0.06, two-tailed).  
A negative interaction term implies that workers’ perceived personal morality as less influential 
in their whistle-blowing decisions.  I then regress the perceived influence of morality on 
worker’s whistle-blowing behavior for each reward condition (i.e., test for simple effects): 
 
(11)                          
 
For the Cannot Reward condition, I find β1 is significantly positive (β1 = 0.27, t = 4.0, p < 
0.01) but does not differ significantly from zero in the Can Reward condition (β1 = 0.06, t = 0.7, 
p =0.48).  Thus, personal morality appears to have affected whistle-blowing decisions only when 
employers could not offer a reward.  This is consistent with categorical motivation crowding:  
the potential for a reward causes workers to no longer view whistle-blowing as a decision made 
on the basis of moral convictions.   
Finally, also consistent with motivation crowding, I find that workers in the Can Reward 
condition never blew the whistle unless their employer offered them a reward for doing so.  As 
shown in Table 2, in 12 instances workers in the Can Reward condition observed theft when 
their employer offered no whistle-blowing reward.  Employers offered a mean wage of $9 in 
these cases (untabulated).  In comparison, workers in the Cannot Reward condition who received 
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a wage offer of $9 observed 11 instances of theft and blew the whistle in three of those instances 
(27.3%).  In summary, workers responded more strongly to wages when making whistle-blowing 
decisions in the Cannot Reward condition; wages and personal morality were positively 
associated with whistle-blowing in the Cannot Reward condition but had no significant 
association with whistle-blowing in the Can Reward condition; and workers never blew the 
whistle without a reward in the Can Reward condition. Combined, these results provide 
substantial support for categorical motivation crowding; that is, the idea that market pricing 
norms crowd out workers’ non-financial motivation to blow the whistle.   
 
6.7 SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
This section briefly summarizes and discusses the results of the study.  Panel A of Table 6 below 
lists my hypotheses and research questions and briefly states the results of the statistical analysis 
for each hypothesis and research question.  Panel B of Table 6 lists the statistical analysis used to 
test each hypothesis and research question and indicates the sample of data included in the 
analysis.  The primary question of the study was whether employers would obtain higher welfare 
by offering a whistle-blowing reward to induce whistle-blowing or by relying on workers’ non-
financial motivation (i.e., RQ1).  To provide a benchmark against which to test the effect of 
offering a reward, I used a setting (Cannot Reward) that mirrors the natural setting in that 
employers do not offer financial rewards for whistle-blowing and workers do not expect them to 
do so. I find that employers’ payoffs were significantly higher when they offered an explicit 
financial reward for whistle-blowing than when they did not, indicating that the incremental 
financial benefit from offering a reward outweighed the incremental cost.   
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Table 6:  Summary of hypotheses, research questions, and statistical analysis 
Panel A.  List of hypotheses and research questions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RQ1: Do employers earn higher payoffs when they offer workers a financial reward for whistle-blowing relative to when they do not? 
Result:  Yes: employers earn higher payoffs when they offer workers a financial reward for whistle-blowing.  
RQ2: Are employers’ expected compensation costs higher when they offer workers a financial reward for whistle-blowing relative to when they do not?
Result:  No: employers' expected compensation costs are not significantly higher when they offer workers a financial reward.
H1: To induce whistle-blowing, employers will offer workers higher compensation when misconduct is possible than when it is not possible. 
Result:  H1 supported.
H2:
Result:  H2 supported.
RQ3: Does the rate at which workers blow the whistle depend upon whether they are offered a financial reward for whistle-blowing? 
Result:  Yes:  workers blow the whistle more frequently when they are offered a financial reward for doing so.
H3:
Result:  H3 supported.
Employers who offer a financial reward for whistle-blowing will not offer any incremental fixed compensation specifically to induce whistle-
blowing. 
When workers can receive a financial reward for whistle-blowing, wage levels have less influence on their whistle-blowing decisions than when 
they cannot receive a reward.
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Table 6 (Continued). 
Panel B.  Summary of statistical analysis 
 
.….........…..Can Reward…….........
Equation Combined
RQ1 1 Employer Payoff = α + β1*Reward + β2*Accept + ε x x
RQ1 2 x x
RQ2 3 Expected Compensation = α + β1*Reward + ε x x
RQ2 4 x x
H1 5 Expected Compensation = α + β1*Misconduct + ε x x x
H2 6 Wage = α + β1*Misconduct + ε x x
RQ3 7 WB = α + β*Reward + ε x x
RQ3 8 WB = α + β1*RewardOffered + β2*Worker Pay + ε x x
x x
H3 9a WB = α + β1*Wage + ε x
H3 9b WB = α + β1*Wage + β2*Reward$ + ε x
x x
x x
Expected Compensation = α + β1*Reward + β2*Period + 
β3*Reward*Period + ε
WB = α + β1*Wage + β2*CanReward + β3*Wage*CanReward + 
β4*Reward$ + ε
9
Cases from which regression sample drawn
H3
11
Reward 
Offered
No Reward 
Offered
PEQ 
Analysis
PEQ 
Analysis
Formal 
Test of:
10
WB Mean = α + β1*CanReward + β2*Morality + 
β3*CanReward*Morality + ε
Regression 
# No W/B
Cannot 
Reward
WB Mean = α + β1*Morality + ε  (Simple effects)
Employer Payoff = α + β1*Reward + β2*Accept + β3*Period + 
β4*Period*Reward + ε
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Employer payoffs are a function of the cost that employers bear to induce workers to 
blow the whistle and the benefit they receive from workers who do so.  Thus, my subsequent 
analysis for RQ2 compared the level of expected compensation employers offered when they 
offered a whistle-blowing reward relative to when they did not.  While employers incur higher 
compensation costs by offering workers a financial reward for whistle-blowing, they also incur 
compensation costs by offering workers a gift wage to increase worker goodwill and induce 
whistle-blowing. Recall that the behavioral-analytical model developed in Chapter 3 suggests 
that the relative cost of inducing whistle-blowing depends upon the strength of crowding out that 
occurs when workers expect employers to offer them a financial reward for whistle-blowing.  
While I find employers in the Can Reward-Reward Offered cases offered directionally higher 
compensation than those in the Cannot Reward condition in all periods, this slight disparity did 
not differ significantly from zero. 
Given no significant differences in expected costs among the whistle-blowing conditions, 
I then tested, in H1, whether employers offered incrementally higher compensation specifically 
to induce whistle-blowing by comparing mean expected compensation offered for the whistle-
blowing treatment conditions (Can Reward and Cannot Reward combined) to mean expected 
compensation in a third control condition in which no theft or whistle-blowing can occur (No 
W/B condition).  Any difference in expected compensation between the treatment (Can Reward 
and Cannot Reward) and control (No W/B) conditions implies that employers expended financial 
resources specifically to induce whistle-blowing.  I find that employers offered incrementally 
higher expected compensation in both treatment conditions relative to the No W/B condition.  
However, my behavioral-analytical model suggests that employers would not offer incrementally 
higher fixed wages to induce whistle-blowing if they could offer an explicit financial reward 
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instead.  Thus, in H2, I test this component of my model and find that, as it predicts, employers 
in the Can Reward condition offered similar fixed wages relative to their counterparts in the No 
W/B control condition. 
 After examining the costs related to inducing whistle-blowing, I also tested which 
approach—offering an explicit financial reward or relying only on nonfinancial motivation—
induced higher levels of whistle-blowing (RQ3).  While financial rewards provide strict financial 
incentives to blow the whistle, workers in the Cannot Reward condition received higher levels of 
gift wages and incurred no cost to blow the whistle.  Thus, I could not predict whether whistle-
blowing rates would differ under the two approaches.  I find that offering a financial reward 
more strongly influences workers to blow the whistle than offering a gift wage.  Specifically, 
workers blew the whistle on observed theft over twice as frequently when they would receive an 
explicit financial reward for doing so as when they were in the Cannot Reward condition.  
Further, workers in the Can Reward condition never blew the whistle unless offered a financial 
reward.  The rate of whistle-blowing when employers offered a reward (~95%) is close to the 
maximum possible rate (i.e., 100%).  The real surprise lies in the relatively low rate of whistle-
blowing in the absence of a reward, even though workers who were not offered a reward (i) 
could blow the whistle at no cost and (ii) received similar levels of expected compensation and 
higher guaranteed (i.e., fixed) wages than those who were offered a reward.  This raises the 
possibility that gift wages may induce less positive reciprocity from workers when employers 
cannot make clear inferences about workers’ reciprocal behavior, as is the case when workers 
can remain credibly silent about observed misconduct.  However, additional research is 
necessary before asserting this definitively.   
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 Finally, I analyzed the effect of motivation crowding on whistle-blowing behavior.  I find 
workers’ whistle-blowing propensity increases in wage level, but only in the Cannot Reward 
condition.  In the Can Reward condition, wages have no predictive value for whistle-blowing 
after controlling for the level of explicit financial reward offered by employers.  This suggests 
that allowing employers to reward whistle-blowers shifts the perceived motivation for whistle-
blowing away from non-financial motivations and toward financial self-interest.  Consistent with 
this interpretation, I find in subsequent PEQ analysis that while workers’ personal morality 
positively influences their whistle-blowing choices in the Cannot Reward condition, personal 
morality has no influence on whistle-blowing in the Can Reward condition.  In sum, offering a 
whistle-blowing reward appears to strengthen workers’ self-interest and weaken the efficacy of 
gift exchange between employers and workers.  Despite this, employers in my setting obtain 
significantly higher payoffs from offering an explicit financial reward because they induce 
significantly more whistle-blowing from workers at no increase in expected compensation cost. 
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7.0  DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION  
 
7.1 OVERVIEW OF CHAPTER 
Section 7.2 briefly discusses the results of the study.  In Section 7.3, I discuss both the 
contributions of the study to the academic literature and also to corporate practice.  Section 7.4 
concludes the chapter by discussing the limitations of my dissertation and suggesting possible 
extensions to my study that future projects could address.   
   
7.2 DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
My study examines strategic interactions between employers and workers in experimental labor 
markets to determine whether (i) employers expend financial resources specifically to induce 
whistle-blowing even when workers blow the whistle at no cost and believe doing so is the right 
thing to do; (ii) the ability to contract on whistle-blowing, in the form of offering workers an 
explicit financial reward for whistle-blowing, affects the amount and form of financial resources 
employers expend to induce whistle-blowing; (iii) offering workers an explicit financial reward 
for whistle-blowing in addition to a fixed wage affects workers’ whistle-blowing choices and 
employer welfare; and (iv) expending financial resources to induce whistle-blowing decreases 
workers’ non-financial motivation to whistle-blow.  Under conventional economic theory, 
employers in my setting should not expend any financial resources to induce whistle-blowing, 
whether in the form of offering a higher fixed wage (“gift wage”) or in the form of offering an 
explicit financial reward for whistle-blowing.   
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 While I did not set out to test conventional economic predictions, deriving them allowed 
me to rule out alternative economic explanations for the behavior observed in my study.   My 
key results follow below.  First, I find strong evidence that employers expend incremental 
financial resources to induce whistle-blowing, even though workers in my setting blow the 
whistle at no cost and have non-financial motivations to do so.  In my Cannot Reward condition, 
employers attempt to induce whistle-blowing by offering incrementally higher gift wages to 
workers, whereas in my Can Reward condition employers generally offered higher incremental 
compensation only in the form of an explicit financial reward rather than in the form of higher 
fixed wages.  Second, despite differences between the two conditions in the form of incremental 
compensation offered to workers to induce whistle-blowing, the overall level of compensation 
employers offered to workers did not differ significantly between the two conditions.   
 Third, despite similarities in expected compensation, I find workers blow the whistle 
more often in response to financial incentives offered in the form of an explicit reward than in 
the form gift wages, and this leads employers who offer an explicit financial reward to earn 
higher payoffs relative to those who do not.  Specifically, workers observing misconduct blew 
the whistle over twice as frequently when their employer offered them an explicit financial 
reward.  Because employers offered similar amounts of total compensation to workers in the 
Cannot Reward and Can Reward-Reward Offered cases, the higher rate of whistle-blowing that 
occurred when employers offered an explicit financial reward led those employers to earn 
relatively higher payoffs.  Whistle-blowing rates approached 95% when employers offered 
workers a reward but only 41.4% in the Cannot Reward condition.  Thus, workers appear to 
respond less to non-contingent financial incentives (i.e., higher gift wages) than to contingent 
ones (i.e., financial rewards payable contingent on the worker blowing the whistle).   
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Recall that workers in my setting could remain credibly silent about observing theft and 
their employer would never know if a theft had occurred.  This could potentially explain the 
relatively low level of whistle-blowing observed in the Cannot Reward condition.  The ability to 
remain credibly silent about theft distinguishes my setting in an important way from prior gift 
exchange studies that examine motivation crowding.  Workers in the classic gift exchange 
context can always choose to positively reciprocate a gift wage with higher levels of effort, and 
employers can infer if they did so based on the level of firm performance observed.  In my 
setting, workers could not reciprocate a gift wage when they did not observe theft, and, further, 
employers could not infer whether low levels of revenue occurred due to chance or due to 
workers remaining silent when they observed theft.  In the next section, I discuss the 
implications of this feature of my setting.   
 Finally, I find evidence that the expectation of receiving a financial reward for whistle-
blowing crowds out gift exchange between employers and workers.  As explained above, when 
employers can offer explicit financial rewards for whistle-blowing, on average they do not offer 
any incremental fixed compensation to induce whistle-blowing (i.e., no incrementally higher gift 
wage).  In addition, I find that whereas gift wages positively influence workers’ whistle-blowing 
decisions when employers cannot reward them for whistle-blowing, wages have no significant 
association with workers’ whistle-blowing choices when employers can reward them for whistle-
blowing.  Likewise, personal morality positively influences workers’ whistle-blowing when 
employers cannot offer a financial reward, but has no significant effect on whistle-blowing when 
employers can do so.   
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7.3 CONTRIBUTIONS 
My study extends prior academic work on both whistle-blowing and motivation crowding.  
Consistent with observed practices in the natural setting, prior studies on internal whistle-
blowing generally treat whistle-blowing as pro-social behavior that helps the employer.  To date, 
however, no prior study has provided a clean test of the relative efficacy and behavioral effects 
of offering workers an explicit financial reward for reporting observed internal misconduct 
versus relying only on their non-financial motivation to report such misconduct.  Such a test is 
important because some firms currently offer financial rewards to internal whistle-blowers while 
others are weighing whether to adopt this approach for themselves.    
 Prior related studies struggle to make clear inferences regarding the determinants of 
whistle-blowing because they rely on field surveys, hypothetical scenarios, or archival data.  
While valuable in answering certain questions, these methods suffer shortcomings that limit their 
internal validity.  For example, workers’ self-reported behavior in surveys may not correspond to 
their actual behavior due to concerns for self-image.  Likewise, the presence of confounds in the 
natural setting make it difficult to assess the economic impact of different whistle-blowing 
approaches.  Thus, for example, the inability to determine the true base rate of employee theft 
within an organization makes it difficult to isolate the incremental effect of a new policy or 
approach on workers’ willingness to blow the whistle from their likelihood of actually observing 
misconduct in the first place.  My dissertation studies whistle-blowing using the methods of 
experimental economics, which tests questions using real financial incentives and allows 
strategic interaction between self-interested parties within a controlled laboratory environment.  
As discussed in Chapter 2, prior research has rarely applied this methodology to the area of 
whistle-blowing. 
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My findings will help employers considering whether to adopt formal whistle-blowing 
reward programs to make more informed decisions about the relative costs and benefits of doing 
so.  Those employers who care less about the negative effects of motivation crowding may find it 
worthwhile to offer such programs.  However, employers who rely heavily on fostering positive, 
reciprocity-based relationships with workers (e.g., Costco) may wish to continue their current 
practice of offering workers only gift wages.  Rewarding whistle-blowers appears to crowd out 
gift exchange between employers and workers.  A whistle-blowing reward could possibly crowd 
out not just worker’s non-financial motivation to blow the whistle but also their non-financial 
motivation to aid their employer in general.  Thus, if rewarding whistle-blowers decreases other 
pro-social behavior, workers may provide less unobservable effort or steal more from their 
employer.   
 My study also contributes to the analytical literature on whistle-blowing and motivation 
crowding by presenting the first behavioral model that integrates these two phenomena.  
Specifically, I derive conditions under which employers will prefer either offering a gift wage or 
offering a reward to induce whistle-blowing.  I find that these two approaches appear mutually 
exclusive, which helps to explain why we do not observe companies offering a mix of whistle-
blowing rewards coupled with gift wages in the natural setting.  As discussed in the next section, 
I conduct an experiment that tests certain implications of my model, but future studies could test 
other implications.  
In addition, I know of no prior study that examines motivation crowding in the context of 
information asymmetry.  Prior work on motivation crowding usually examines participant 
behavior under conditions of moral hazard.  Information asymmetry provides workers with the 
ability to remain credibly silent about what they know.  This leads to “noisy feedback” for 
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employers about the relative effectiveness of using gift wages versus rewards to induce whistle-
blowing.  In the classic gift exchange setting, employers can infer worker effort based on 
observed output because no state uncertainty exists, but nonetheless cannot contract on worker 
effort.  Likewise, workers know that employers can perfectly infer their effort level.  Thus, 
workers know whether their employer has treated them well, and employers know whether their 
worker has positively reciprocated their generosity by providing more effort or has negatively 
reciprocated by shirking.  In the context of whistle-blowing, workers still know whether their 
employer has treated them well, but when workers remain silent employers cannot infer if the 
silence reflects poor treatment from their worker or if the worker simply did not observe theft.  
The ability to remain credibly silent appears to heighten workers’ apathy toward their employer’s 
welfare and dampen their reciprocal impulses more than would occur if workers could not 
remain credibly silent. My findings suggest employers can overcome these deleterious effects 
more easily by offering workers a financial reward than by offering them a gift wage.   
Finally, I believe my study has implications for corporate codes of ethics and public 
policy.  Recent whistle-blower legislation has emphasized more stringent anti-retaliation 
standards in order to encourage workers to come forward with information (e.g., the Sarbanes-
Oxley and Dodd-Frank Acts).  Similarly, most corporate codes of ethics strongly emphasize 
protection for internal whistle-blowers against retaliation.  My results show that, even when 
workers do not fear retaliation and know that whistle-blowing benefits their employer, a large 
number of them may still choose to remain silent rather than blow the whistle when they have no 
financial incentive to come forward.  Thus, the stringent anti-retaliation standards included in 
regulations and corporate codes of ethics may not increase whistle-blowing as much as 
conventional wisdom suggests.  In other words, merely protecting whistle-blowers from 
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retaliation may not suffice to induce workers to come forward.  Instead, the key may lie in taking 
proactive steps to ensure workers can improve their own welfare by speaking up.  My findings 
suggest that offering a financial reward may more effectively accomplish this than relying only 
on workers’ non-financial motives. 
 
7.4 LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
Motivation crowding is an intuitively appealing explanation for why in practice employers forgo 
offering rewards for whistle-blowing.  However, alternative explanation exist, and the fact 
remains that employers in my study obtain relatively higher welfare by offering whistle-blowing 
rewards, even though doing so crowds out workers’ non-financial motivation to blow the 
whistle.  Thus, reasons other than concerns about motivation crowding could explain why 
employers forgo offering whistle-blowing rewards.  Below, I offer three possible behavioral 
explanations.  By behavioral explanations, I mean those grounded in social psychology rather 
than explanations based on institutional constraints such as limitations in technology or other 
resources.   
First, social norms and taboos may favor an approach that offers indirect financial 
incentives for whistle-blowing.  Generally, society appears to frown on those who exploit others’ 
misfortune for their own financial gain.  Social mores encourage us to help the victims of crime 
and discourage us from profiting from their loss.  In the context of whistle-blowing, this implies 
that employers and workers might perceive offering or accepting a reward for blowing the 
whistle on internal misconduct as immoral, even though workers blow the whistle more often 
when they have a financial incentive to do so than when they do not.  My study incorporates 
many of the key features of the natural setting that one would wish to find in a study on whistle-
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blowing (e.g., credible silence, no retaliation, whistle-blower anonymity), but it may not 
perfectly capture the strength of social norms that deter rewarding whistle-blowers financially.   
My study’s design seeks to strike a balance between two opposing concerns that 
experimenters commonly face.  Specifically, the instructions provided to participants had to 
avoid inducing behavior merely from demand effects, but they also had to ensure participants 
had sufficient context such that their observed behavior would generalize to behavior one would 
observe in similar settings in the natural environment.  I believe my study strikes a reasonable 
balance between these two concerns, but, on the basis of the relatively low level of whistle-
blowing I find in the Cannot Reward condition, future studies may wish to provide a stronger 
ethical context for whistle-blowing.  One possible approach to achieve this might be to 
incorporate a strong corporate code of conduct that explicitly addresses whistle-blowing into the 
experimental instrument provided to participants.   
Second, employers may forgo offering financial rewards because they believe that 
fostering non-financial motivation for whistle-blowing results in higher overall welfare 
improvements.  My study does not incorporate all the potential benefits of gift wages, but merely 
examines the incremental effect of a gift wage on whistle-blowing.  Offering a financial reward 
for whistle-blowing may reduce workers’ pro-social behavior in other areas that can benefit the 
firm.  For example, workers may provide less effort or steal more when offered a whistle-
blowing reward because they perceive themselves as relatively more opportunistic and less 
reciprocal toward their employers.  Thus, employers may not offer a whistle-blowing reward 
because of concerns this could negatively affect workers’ behavior in other ways.  Third, 
employers in my study offset the cost of whistle-blower rewards by offering lower wages.  In the 
natural setting, workers may be accustomed to receiving a certain level of gift wage.  To the 
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extent that this is the case, employers may not wish to replace workers’ gift wages with whistle-
blowing rewards if they believe doing so could lead workers to exhibit more anti-social behavior 
in response to a wage cut (see, e.g., Greenberg 1990, Hannan 2005).   
Readers may also wonder about the sensitivity of my results to the fact that workers in 
my study bore no cost to blow the whistle and could not make false allegations (i.e., report theft 
when none occurred).  While these two features may at first appear restrictive, they are quite 
realistic for the type of whistle-blowing I study.  Employers likely will not retaliate or allow 
others to retaliate against internal whistle-blowers who report co-worker misconduct against the 
employer because workers’ whistle-blowing increases rather than decreases employer welfare.  
Workers also have no incentive to make false allegations in either of my conditions.  They 
receive a reward in the Can Reward condition only if the employer recovers the loss caused by 
internal misconduct, and they never benefit financially from making false allegations in the 
Cannot Reward condition, and thus they have no incentive to make such allegations.  
In the natural setting, employers could strengthen workers’ non-financial whistle-blowing 
motivation in ways that do not entail offering higher wages, and these ways could potentially 
induce more whistle-blowing than simply offering a higher gift wage. I chose to examine gift 
wages as opposed to other mechanisms that increase workers’ non-financial motivations for three 
reasons.  First, gift exchange is a robust and well-vetted method of boosting workers’ non-
financial motivations, especially within laboratory settings. Second, unlike other approaches to 
strengthening non-financial motivation, the gift exchange mechanism allows me to objectively 
quantify the financial cost employers’ incurred to strengthen workers’ non-financial motivations 
and thus allowed me to compare this cost to the expected cost of the explicit financial rewards 
employers offered for whistle-blowing in another condition.  Third, to the extent that employers 
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consider expending financial resources to induce whistle-blowing, my study can help them make 
an informed decision about the relative efficacy of two different approaches of doing so.  Future 
research could examine the efficacy of alternative indirect mechanisms of inducing whistle-
blowing.   
A future study could also incorporate other implicit incentives into my setting.  For 
example, a follow-up study could examine a setting in which employers would not bind need to 
bind themselves to offering whistle-blowers an explicit financial reward but rather could pay a 
reward amount of their choice on an ex post basis with no ex ante promises.  Such a setting might 
represent the “best of both worlds” in that it may mitigate the negative effects of motivation 
crowding while allowing employers to offer lower rewards than they had to offer in order to 
induce whistle-blowing in my Can Reward condition.   
 In any experiment that tests welfare across conditions, readers often have concerns about 
the sensitivity of the results to the parameters present in the experiment.  My study should 
alleviate some of these concerns because I incorporate strategic interaction into my setting.  
Thus, the key parameters of my study—wage levels, reward levels, and whistle-blowing rates—
all arise endogenously as a result of decisions made by employers and workers who may wish to 
maximize their welfare.  I as the experimenter imposed none of these parameters exogenously.  
However, note that I do exogenously manipulate my three experimental conditions.  As such, my 
experiment examines endogenous behavior across exogenously manipulated conditions.  
My behavioral model suggests that only one exogenous parameter, the base rate of theft, 
will affect the relative performance of each incentive approach at improving employer welfare.  I 
do not test this prediction in the current study, but a promising follow-up study would manipulate 
the base rate of theft to determine the empirical validity of this prediction.  However, note three 
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key points related to the base rate of theft.  First, I set the base rate of theft to equal the mid-point 
of the range of possible rates of theft (i.e., I set it at 50%).  This should mitigate concerns that I 
biased in favor of finding that one approach bested the other.  Second, though the base rate of 
theft in the experiment equals the mid-point of 50%, it is likely that this rate exceeds the rate of 
misconduct in the natural setting.  One wonders how long a company could survive in the natural 
setting if it lost half of its revenue to worker misconduct.  As such, it seems reasonable to 
presume that companies likely have lower rates of misconduct than that imposed here.  However, 
recall that my model predicts that lower rates of misconduct actually bias in favor of reliance on 
rewards and bias against the use of gift wages.  Thus, my finding that employers received higher 
payoffs by offering a reward even when the base rate of theft equaled 50% only strengthens the 
case for offering a reward if lower rates of theft exist in the natural setting.   
Finally, to make my model more tractable I assume that the rate of theft does not affect 
workers’ behavioral thresholds, but little empirical evidence exists either to support or refute this 
assumption.  Thus, higher rates of theft increase the relative attractiveness of gift wages under 
ceteris paribus assumptions, but we simply do not know whether the incidence of theft within a 
firm affects these thresholds.  Likewise, neither do we know whether the magnitude of theft 
affects these thresholds.  I do not wish to imply that the frequency and magnitude of theft have 
no effect on workers’ thresholds:  I simply do not attempt to incorporate them into my behavioral 
model because doing so would greatly increase the complexity of the model and reduce its 
tractability.  Likewise, as discussed extensively in Chapter 3, my model also does not incorporate 
strategic behavior on the part of the would-be thief.  Follow-up research, including analytical 
research, may wish to examine this further.  
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In conclusion, I believe the limitations and opportunities I describe above offer 
accounting researchers a promising stream of future research.  This is especially true for 
researchers employing experimental economics and analytical methods of research.  Prior studies 
have generally not examined whistle-blowing using these methods, which has left gaps in our 
knowledge of why workers blow the whistle and how best to induce more of them to do so.  I 
believe my dissertation begins to fill in some of these gaps, but much work in this area remains.  
My dissertation also provides researchers with a new way of thinking about the relationship of 
internal whistle-blowing and financial incentives and also provides a new way of 
operationalizing internal whistle-blowing within a controlled laboratory setting that incorporates 
real financial incentives.  I believe these theoretical and methodological contributions in turn can 
provide a good foundation upon which to build future work that can provide employers with 
additional important insights about how to foster whistle-blowing in order to mitigate their losses 
and improve their welfare. 
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